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DO GOOD AND GET RICH: FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FOR WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT
ELLETrA SANGREY CALLAHAN*
TERRY MOREHEAD DWORKIN**
I. INTRODUCTIONt
F EW would argue that the eradication of societally harmful
conduct is an important governmental goal. There is, how-
ever, greater uncertainty as to the most effective and appropriate
means of achieving that goal. One means which has become par-
ticularly widespread in the last decade and is believed by legisla-
tors, both federal and state, to reduce wrongdoing is the
encouragement of whistleblowing. Two different legislative ap-
proaches have been taken to stimulate this disclosure of harmful
conduct. The most common approach has been to extend legal
recourse-typically reinstatement and lost compensation-to
whistleblowers who suffer from employment-related retaliation
for their disclosures. A few states and the federal government,
however, have gone a step further by enacting statutes that create
or strengthen financial incentives for whistleblowers.' Most nota-
bly, the federal False Claims Act (FCA) 2 was revised in 1986 to
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cuse University.
** Professor, Business Law, Graduate School of Business, Indiana
University.
t The comments of Mildred Doering, Associate Professor of Human
Resource Management, Syracuse University, George Dreher, Professor of
Management, Indiana University, and Janet Near, Professor of Management,
Indiana University, on an earlier draft of this article are gratefully acknowledged.
Partial funding for research for this article was provided by the Amoco
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1. In recent years, corporations have also exhibited interest in offering such
rewards. See, e.g., GM Offers Reward In Effort To Stop Leaks, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1989, at D2 (discussing GM's offer of up to $30,000 for information leading to
persons that leak product-related information); David J. Solomon, Hotlines and
Hefty Rewards: Retailers Step Up Efforts to Curb Employee Theft, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
1987, at A37 (discussing retailer hotlines and rewards for information on em-
ployee theft).
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988). Section 3730 of this statute provides:
(b) ACTIONS BY PRIVATE PERSONS.-(I) A person may bring a civil
action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United
States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the
(273)
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significantly increase the potential rewards for whistleblowers and
to broaden the range of individuals permitted to bring suit. s
Presumably, the value of financial incentives for whistleblow-
ing should be measured in terms of whether the incentives will
effectively encourage individuals to disclose illegal and unethical
activity. Examination of the potential efficacy of such rewards,
Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their rea-
sons for consenting.
(c) RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES TO Qui TAM ACTIONS.-
(3) If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the ac-
tion. If the Government so requests, it shall be served with copies of all
pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied with copies of all
deposition transcripts (at the Government's expense). When a person
proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status and
rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the
Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.
(d) AWARD TO Qui TAM PLAINTIFF.-(I) If the Government proceeds
with an action brought by a person under subsection (b), such person shall,
subject to the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at least 15 percent
but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of
the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially con-
tributed to the prosecution of the action. Where the action is one which the
court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of specific information
(other than information provided by the person bringing the action) relat-
ing to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil or administrative hear-
ing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the court
may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than
10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of the infor-
mation and the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the case
to litigation. Any payment to a person under the first or second sentence of
this paragraph shall be made from the proceeds. Any such person shall also
receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have
been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. All
such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
(2) If the Government does not proceed with an action under this section,
the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount
which the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and
damages. The amount shall be not less than 25 percent and not more than
30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement and shall be paid out
of such proceeds. Such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable
expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus rea-
sonable attorneys' fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be
awarded against the defendant.
Id. § 3730. There is also a criminal section of the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 287 (1988), which allows fines of up to $10,000, imprisonment up to five years
or both. This Article, however, focuses on the civil sections of the FCA, and
especially on the rights of third parties to recover thereunder.
3. For a detailed discussion of the FCA, see infra notes 111-81 and accom-
panying text.
274 [Vol. 37: p. 273
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however, makes plain a more fundamental issue-whether the en-
couragement of whistleblowing is, in fact, the best way to combat
wrongful activity. In addressing this issue, a number of policy
questions should be considered: whether the motive of the
whistleblower should be relevant to legal recognition of his or her
claim; whether statutory protection of whistleblowing will spur
groundless claims; whether the government should affirmatively
encourage individuals to "spy" on each other; and what effect
whistleblowing incentives will have on the employment
environment.
This Article begins with a brief description of the ineffective-
ness of legislative efforts in the last decade to encourage
whistleblowing.4 The potential effectiveness of financial incen-
tives to foster whistleblowing is then assessed by examining the
social-psychological literature on the use of money rewards by or-
ganizations. 5 The history of and revisions to the False Claims
Act, as well as other federal reward statutes, are next discussed in
the context of the reward efficacy literature. 6 Finally, the broader
issue is addressed-whether financial incentives to encourage
whistleblowing are advisable, rather than simply effective. 7
II. WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION IN THE 1980s
A. Protection from Retaliation
Three-quarters of the states currently have whistleblowing
legislation, for the most part enacted in the last decade. 8 The
4. For a discussion of these legislative efforts, see infra notes 8-37 and ac-
companying text.
5. For a discussion of the social science research on financial rewards for
whistleblowing, see infra notes 38-110 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the FCA and other federal reward statutes, see infia
notes 111-81 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the advisability of financial incentives to encourage
whistleblowing, see infra notes 182-253 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-531, -532 (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting
retaliation against state employees for disclosure of information that is of public
concern); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5 (1988) (encouraging state employees to
disclose information on state agencies not acting in public interest; prohibiting
retaliation for those disclosures; providing mechanism to file complaints alleg-
ing retaliation; providing for civil actions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1991)
(protecting employees who report violations or suspected violations of law; pro-
viding right of civil action for injunctive relief and/or actual damages); see gener-
ally STEPHEN M. KOHN & MICHAEL D. KOHN, THE LABOR LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS 39-59 (1988) (dis-
cussing development of state protections for private sector whistleblowers; pro-
viding state-by-state breakdown of public policy exception to common law
termination-at-will doctrine). For a comprehensive chart of state whistleblowing
3
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nearly uniform focus of these laws is to protect whistleblowers
from retaliation and to give them a remedy when retaliation oc-
curs.9 Most commonly, the successful litigant's remedy under
such a statute is a recovery of lost benefits and wages, and a re-
turn to the job lost due to the illegal retaliation.' 0 The assump-
tion underlying this legislation is that, because most
whistleblowers suffer retaliation, potential whistleblowers are de-
terred from reporting wrongdoing.'I Thus, it was supposed, the
affordance of protection from retaliation would increase em-
ployee disclosure of wrongdoing. 12
provisions, see Terry M. Dworkin, Charting the Course of Whistleblowing, 14 SE-
LECTED PAPERS OF TRI-STATE REGIONAL Bus. L. ASS'N 48, 61-67 (1990) (copy on
file with Villanova Law Review).
9. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-532(A) ("[ilt is a prohibited person-
nel practice for an employee who has control over personnel actions to take
reprisal against an employee for a disclosure of information of a matter of public
concern"); id. § 38-532(D) ("employee or former employee against whom a pro-
hibited personnel practice is committed may recover attorney fees, costs, back
pay, general and special damages and full reinstatement"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 112.3187(4) (West Supp. 1991) ("agency or independent contractor shall not
dismiss, discipline, or take any other adverse personnel action against an em-
ployee for disclosing information pursuant to the provisions of this section"); id.
§ 112.3187(9) (relief may include reinstatement, compensation for lost wages,
payment of reasonable costs).
A number of federal regulatory statutes have provisions protecting
whistleblowers against retaliation as well. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1214 (Supp. 11 1990) (protecting employees who disclose
government illegalities, waste and corruption); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-9 (1988) (prohibiting retaliation against employees who assist in
bringing action to administer or enforce drinking water regulations); Energy Re-
organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988) (prohibiting retaliation against em-
ployee who brings or assists proceeding for violation of Atomic Energy Act);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988) (prohibiting retaliation against employee
who brings or assists proceeding for violation of Clean Air Act); see generally
KOHN & KOHN, supra note 8, at 151-96 (describing many of these protective fed-
eral statutes).
10. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-104 (providing for relief including,
but not limited to, reinstatement, back pay, restoration of lost service credit and
reimbursement of costs); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187(9) (providing for relief
which may include reinstatement of position, fringe benefits and seniority rights,
lost wages, benefits, or other lost remuneration and reasonable costs (including
attorneys' fees)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 79.28 (West 1991) (providing affirmative
relief for retaliation, including reinstatement with/without back pay or other eq-
uitable relief deemed appropriate by court). For a general discussion of these
provisions, see Janet P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistle-blowing Process:
Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory, (scheduled for publication
in ORGANIZATION SCI. 1992).
11. See Near et al., supra note 10 (discussing fact that retaliation is seen as
primary, if not sole, deterrent to whistleblowing; it is assumed most employees
are people of conscience who would report wrongdoing if they did not fear
retaliation).
12. For example, the preamble to one such law states:
To help achieve ...[whistleblowing], the general assembly declares
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss2/2
Do GOOD AND GET RICH
These assumptions, while intuitively appealing, have proved
to be untrue. A study of the first state anti-retaliation statutes for
private sector employees indicated that the statutes were not ef-
fective in encouraging whistleblowing.13 In a four-year period,
only three appellate cases in the three states studied concerned
employees who sought protection under the statutes, and these
whistleblowers met with only limited success. 14 Further, the
number of suits relying on the anti-retaliation statutes was no
higher than the number filed on the basis of common law princi-
ples in states without such statutes.' 5 A follow-up examination of
that state employees should be encouraged to disclose information on
actions of state agencies that are not in the public interest and that leg-
islation is needed to ensure that any employee making such disclosures
shall not be subject to disciplinary measures or harassment by any pub-
lic official.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-101.
13. See Terry M. Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They
Working?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241 (1987) (discussing study of initial impact of state
whistleblowing statutes-including those of Connecticut, Maine and Michigan-
which argued that statutes' failure to protect whistleblowers was primarily due to
legislative drafting errors and ineffective judicial interpretation); see also CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West Supp. 1991) (requiring employees to exhaust
all administrative channels before bringing civil action); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 833 (West 1988) (providing for protection of private employees, but not
clearly providing for compensation for whistleblowing employees; requiring em-
ployees to first bring alleged violation to attention of supervisor); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 15.362-.369 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) (providing for protection
of employees; establishing right to bring civil action and remedies).
14. See Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (limiting damages awarded to discharged employee who brought suit
under Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act to back pay; rejecting em-
ployee's claim for reinstatement or actual damages); Watassek v. Michigan Dep't
of Mental Health, 372 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (denying rnotion for
summary judgment against employee suing for retaliatory discharge; although
case not brought under Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act because dis-
charge took place prior to passage of Act, Act was cited as expression of "public
policy pre-existing its actual enactment"); Covell v. Spengler, 366 N.W.2d 76
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding no cause of action existed under Michigan
Whistleblowers' Protection Act where plaintiff failed to meet 90 day statute of
limitations specified in Act).
Thus, at the time of this study (1985), only two appellate cases had been
decided under Michigan's whistleblowing statute; no claims had been made
under the statutes of either Connecticut or Maine. See Dworkin & Near, supra
note 13, at 258. Two common law claims, however, were decided in Connecti-
cut in 1985. See id. These cases involved firings which took place in 1982, the
year the Connecticut whistleblowing statute became effective. See id.
15. See Dworkin & Near, supra note 13, at 254-58. The number of suits un-
covered in this study was comparable to or lower than the number of suits
brought by whistleblowers in states without protection statutes but recognizing a
right to sue for discharges violative of public policy. See id. at 258-60. The three
states studied for comparison purposes were Illinois, Hawaii and Arizona. Id.
They were selected because they had similar populations in size to those of
Michigan, Maine and Connecticut, respectively. Id.
27719921
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cases through 1989 demonstrated little change from this pat-
tern. 16 In addition, a major study of thousands of federal employ-
ees showed similar results. 17
B. Financial Incentives fir Whistleblowing
Providing significant monetary rewards to encourage
whistleblowing is an approach quite different from that taken in
most of the whistleblowing statutes passed in the 1980s. Only
two states, Oregon and South Carolina, explicitly offer financial
rewards for whistleblowing, and in each instance, the legislature
seemed reluctant to make the rewards significant enough to have
much impact. Oregon's statute allows public employee
whistleblowers to collect $250 if this amount would be greater
than the damages awarded in a suit based on retaliation for the
whistleblowing.' 8 The reward in South Carolina is twenty-five
percent of the savings resulting from the whistleblowing in the
first year, up to a maximum of $2000.19 Additionally, Wisconsin
16. Terry M. Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblower Statutes and Reality: Is
There a Need for Realignment?, 1990 PROC. PAC. Sw. Bus. L. Ass'N 73, 74, 76
(1990). While the number of cases had increased slightly, no plaintiff had yet
won a recovery. The primary reason for this lack of success was, according to
the courts, that the statutes were being used for purposes not intended by the
legislatures. See, e.g., Wolcott v. Champion Int'l Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (holding that no causal connection existed between protected con-
duct of employee and discharge; according to court, legislature did not intend
statute "to be used as an offensive weapon by disgruntled employees"); Hopkins
v. City of Midland, 404 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that action
was brought to avoid results of adverse arbitration decision, but employee's fail-
ure to raise whistleblower claim in prior arbitration did not bar its later
consideration).
17. See Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Incidence of Wrongdoing, Whistle-
Blowing and Retaliation: Results of a Naturally Occurring Field Experiment, 2 EMPLOYEE
RESPS. & RTs. J. 91 (1989). The study of several thousand federal employees
covered by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), which contains an anti-retalia-
tion provision, showed a slight increase in whistleblowing after the passage of
the CSRA. Id. at 101. While the incidence of anonymous whistleblowing was
higher after the passage of the protective legislation, the incidence of retaliation
against non-anonymous whistleblowers remained the same. Id. Based on this
data, the researchers concluded that other measures were needed to encourage
whistleblowing. Id. at 107.
18. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.530 (1991). Under the Oregon statute, a public
employee who suffers retaliation may file an action for injunctive relief or dam-
ages "in the circuit court of the county in which the alleged violation occurred,
or the county in which the complainant resides. If damages are awarded, the
court shall award actual damages or $250, whichever is greater." Id. It is un-
clear whether this amount is thought of as a reward, or merely reimbursement
for the time and expense involved in filing a report. In any event, it is not signif-
icant enough to have much, if any, impact on whistleblowing.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The South Caro-
lina statute provides:
278 [Vol. 37: p. 273
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allows the possibility of a reward-if the reward is offered by the
government for the purpose of obtaining information to improve
state administration or operations.20 The general antipathy of
the states to financial rewards is reflected in the statutes of some
states which go so far as to refuse to protect whistleblowers from
retaliation if the whistleblower stands to benefit by reporting the
wrongdoing. 21
Congress, perhaps in recognition of the failure of the ex-
isting anti-retaliation statutes to encourage whistleblowing, does
not share the states' distrust of rewards. 22 In the last several
If the employee's report, expose, or testimony results in a saving of any
public money from the abuses described in this section, twenty-five per-
cent of the estimated net savings resulting from the first year of imple-
mentation of the employee's report, expose, or testimony, but not
more than two thousand dollars, must be rewarded to the employee by
the public body, as determined by the State Budget and Control Board.
Id.
20. WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 230.83(2) (West 1987). The pertinent section of
this statute states:
This section [prohibiting retaliatory action] does not apply to an em-
ploye [sic] who discloses information if the employe [sic] knows or an-
ticipates that the disclosure is likely to result in the receipt of anything
of value for the employe [sic] or for the employe's [sic] immediate fam-
ily, unless the employe [sic] discloses information in pursuit of any
award offered by any governmental unit for information to improve
government administration or operation.
Id.
21. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1422, 1423 (1987); W. VA. CODE
§ 6C-1-2(d), -1-3 (1988). Both statutes employ the same language. The statutes
provide that an employer may not "discharge, threaten or otherwise discrimi-
nate or retaliate against an employee ... because the employee ... makes a good
faith report . . . of wrongdoing or waste." 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1423; W.
VA. CODE § 6C-1-3. A "good faith report" is defined as a "report of conduct
defined in this act as wrongdoing or waste which is made without malice or con-
sideration of personal benefit .... 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1422; W. VA. CODE
§ 6C-l-2(d) (emphasis added). Wisconsin will not protect whistleblowing that is
motivated by gaining "anything of value" unless it is the government offering an
award in order to get information to improve administration or operation.
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 230.83(2).
22. See Fred Strasser, When the Big Whistle Blows.... NAT'L L.J., May 8, 1989,
at 1, 43 (discussing history and impact of qui tam laws and FCA). With the False
Claims Act, Congress raised the possible recovery for a whistleblower to treble
the amount of the fraud, and the fine for each false claim from $2,000 to
$10,000, with thousands of claims possible in each case. Id. at 43. There are
also private awards for whistleblowing. The Cavalo Prize (established by money
market manager Michael Cavalo), for example, makes $10,000 awards to
whistleblowers. Jeff Goldberg, Truth & Consequences, OMNI, Nov. 1990, at 73,
113. Another private award is the Lear Award, named after television producer
Norman Lear who recently pledged $1 million to form the Business Enterprise
Trust to award money to companies and whistleblowers who behave ethically.
James Srodes, Corporations Discover It's Good To Be Good, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Sum-
mer 1990, at 57, 57-58.
19921 279
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years, Congress has included financial incentives in statutes pro-
posed or passed to curb organizational wrongdoing.2 3 For exam-
ple, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA) 24 (the savings and loan "bailout" legisla-
tion) provides for rewards to whistleblowers. Under this law, an
"appropriate Federal banking agency" can pay as much as twenty-
five percent of the recovered fine, penalty, restitution, or forfei-
ture, to a maximum of $100,000, to an informant whose original
information leads to the recovery. 25 In the same year, Congress
authorized money awards of up to $250,000 for whistleblowers
providing information for criminal cases against federal contrac-
tors. 2 6 Under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, Congress, in
1988, authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission to of-
fer rewards, of up to ten percent of the penalty imposed, for in-
formation leading to civil insider-trading penalties. 27
23. One House bill, H.R. 4983, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), authored by
Ohio Congressman John Kasich and designed to double the reward under the
Inspector General's Federal Employee Incentive Awards Program for disclosure
of waste or fraud by government employees, came close to passage in Congress
last year. John Kasich, Incentives Bill Moves Forward, REPORTS TO THE 12TH Dis-
TRICT (Ohio CongressmanJohn Kasich, Washington, D.C.),July 1990, at 2. The
reward would have been $20,000; additional presidential awards would have
been doubled to $40,000. Id. In the same vein, the State Department has
doubled to $4 million the possible reward for providing information that would
help catch terrorists. Rewardsfor Aiding to Nab Terrorists Are Increased, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 17, 1990, at A4.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1831k (Supp. 11 1990) (authorizing federal banking agen-
cies to pay reward to persons providing original information which leads to re-
coveries greater than $50,000). This section of the bill applies to both banking
and thrift institutions.
25. Id. § 1831k(b). In order to be eligible for the award, a person must
have provided information that led to a recovery of a criminal fine, restitution,
civil penalty or forfeiture under specified statutes. Id. § 1831k(a). Officers or
employees of the United States or a state or local government who obtained
information in the performance of their official duties, however, cannot collect a
reward. Id. § 1831k(c).
26. H.R. REP. No. 273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 595 (authorizing Attorney General to give awards to
whistleblowers and establishing funds to make awards under Major Fraud Act).
27. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (1988). The award is taken only from the penalty assessed,
not from illegal profits recovered, up to a maximum amount of 10% of such
penalty. Id. According to the statute:
[T]here shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under this
section and recovered by the Commission or the Attorney General,
such sums, not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the Commis-
sion deems appropriate, to the person or persons who provide informa-
tion leading to the imposition of such penalty.
Id. As with FIRREA, no payment may be made to "any member, officer, or em-
ployee of any appropriate regulatory agency, the Department of Justice, or a
self-regulatory organization." Id.
[Vol. 37: p. 273
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These legislative efforts to spur whistleblowing are not insub-
stantial. Because the rewards they provide are discretionary and
the amounts available are relatively small, however, the most sig-
nificant recoveries by whistleblowers are likely to be made under
the federal False Claims Act. 28 As its name implies, the False
Claims Act is designed to allow recovery of monies falsely claimed
by government contractors. 29 While the government itself can
Since the enactment of these civil penalty provisions, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has approved rules under which it will award these boun-
ties. See Paul Duke Jr., SEC Set to Award Bounties to Tipsters On Insider Trading,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 1991, at Cl. Under these rules, information may be pro-
vided anonymously, and the informant can identify himself or herself when actu-
ally applying for the reward. Id. The informant must apply for the award within
180 days after the court orders a civil penalty in a case based on the information.
Id. Whether the award is given is up to the SEC commissioners. Id.
28. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988) (liability under FCA is defined in
§ 3729; § 3730 describes civil actions for false claims and explains responsibili-
ties of Attorney General and rights of private parties to bring actions; § 3731
delineates false claims procedure; § 3732 provides false claims jurisdiction;
§ 3733 details discovery process in false claims litigation, especially power of
federal government to issue civil investigative demands to persons believed to
have information pertaining to false claim). For a comparison of the discretion-
ary awards under other federal statutes to awards given under the False Claims
Act, see infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
29. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). This section provides:
(a) LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN AcTs.-Any person who-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved
by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or
fraudulent claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used,
or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Gov-
ernment or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be
delivered, less property than the amount for which the person receives
a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of
property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to de-
fraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without com-
pletely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or
debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government,
or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge
the property; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the Government,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of
1992]
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pursue remedies under the FCA,30 third parties are also author-
ized to seek claims in the name of the government, and to keep up
to thirty percent of any treble damages and fines recovered. 3' Re-
wards under the FCA can be significant given the fact that the
Justice Department has estimated fraud to be as much as ten per-
cent of the federal budget, or one hundred billion dollars a
year. 32 In certain industries, such as defense contracting, where
fraudulent claims often involve millions of dollars, successful
whistleblowers can come away multimillionaires.33 With the
outside statute of limitations set at ten years, 34 and with the devel-
opment of an aggressive False Claims bar, 35 FCA suits are pre-
damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that per-
son ....
Id.
30. Id. § 3730(a). This section provides: "The Attorney General diligently
shall investigate a violation under section 3729. If the Attorney General finds
that a person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney General may
bring a civil action under this section against the person." Id.
31. Id. § 3730(b), (d). For the text of these sections, see supra note 2.
32. Mark Thompson, Stealth Law, CAL. LAw., Oct. 1988, at 33. With a fed-
eral budget of approximately $1 trillion per year, "they're talking about a range
of $100 billion of fraud a year-and this is a 10-year statute so it covers fraud
going back 10 years." Id. at 33-34 (quoting John R. Phillips, co-director of
Center for Law in the Public Interest in Los Angeles and lawyer who helped to
conceive and draft 1986 FCA amendments). Fraud in the military alone is esti-
mated by the Defense Department at $1 billion annually. Strasser, supra note 22,
at 42.
33. Many of the cases that the government has decided to join allege well
over $100 million in damages each. Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon
Fraud, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1990, at 46, 48. According to the Justice Department, as
of October 1989, 13 FCA cases had been settled for $26.7 million, with $2.7
million going to the private plaintiffs. Id. at 46. In one case against Industrial
Tectonics, the government recovered $14.3 million. Richard W. Stevenson,
Workers Who Turn in Bosses Use Law to Seek Big Rewards, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1989,
at Al. The former Tectonics employee who started the suit and provided evi-
dence of overcharging was awarded $1.4 million. Id.
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (1988). According to the provision:
A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought-
(I) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of sec-
tion 3729 is committed, or
(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the
right of action are known or reasonably should have been known
by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to
act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after
the date on which the violation is committed,
whichever occurs last.
Id.
35. An aggressive, although perhaps small, FCA bar is a likely develop-
ment. See, e.g., RichardJ. Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims Act,
22 AKRON L. REV. 525, 525-26 (1989) (stating that publicity surrounding large
dollar FCA suits and resultant rewards for both private plaintiffs and attorneys
(through fees) provide incentive for suits; plaintiffs' counsel are now specializing
10
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dicted to rival suits filed under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 36 in number and to exceed
them in awards.3 7 Are these predictions likely to come true, or
will they, like the presumptions about retaliation protection,
prove to be little more than "whistling in the wind"?
III. FINANCIAL REWARDS FOR WHISTLEBLOWING: A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVE
To make any meaningful predictions about the success of re-
wards to spur whistleblowing, a review of the current social-psy-
chological literature on rewards is necessary. While logical, such
reviews are not systematically undertaken during the process of
drafting legislation despite the fact that an abundance of material
is often available. For example, coverage of reward systems is as
standard to an organizational behavior or human resources man-
agement text as is coverage of the doctrine of consideration to a
contract law hornbook.38 In addition to the extensive mainstream
literature pertaining to reward systems, whistleblowing as a dis-
crete area of study has been a focus of social-psychological re-
search for the last decade.3 9 It does not appear, however, that a
in FCA suits); Goldberg, supra note 22, at 76, 108 (stating that Washington D.C.
attorney Louis Clark, executive director of Government Accountability Project,
"has counseled thousands of whistle-blowers and has organized a crack legal
team to work in their behalf"); Strasser, supra note 22, at 42 (stating that one
plaintiff's attorney believes that FCA bar will take tougher stand on settlements
and do better job litigating claims because private attorneys look at bottom line).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). For a discussion of
the popularity of actions under RICO, see infra notes 224-30 and accompanying
text.
37. See France, supra note 33, at 49 (stating that FCA qui tam actions have
potential for greater impact than RICO suits because whistleblowing involves
"grass roots enforcement"); Goldberg, supra note 22, at 108 (stating that FCA, if
upheld by courts, "is expected to create a ground swell of whistle-blower activ-
ity"); Strasser, supra note 22, at 43 (according to FCA plaintiff's attorney, if FCA
can survive politically, it will make RICO litigation "look like an infant").
38. See, e.g., WAYNE F. CASCIO, MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES 426-61 (2d
ed. 1989) (discussing general motivational strategies, including different types
of financial rewards used to improve employee performance and to motivate
certain types of behavior); GEORGE T. MILKOVICH &JOHN W. BOUDREAU, HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 495-518 (6th ed. 1991) (examining and evaluating dif-
ferent pay techniques and financial incentive systems used by employers); GREG-
ORY MOORHEAD & RICKY W. GRIFFIN, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 175-87 (2d ed.
1989) (describing components and management of reward systems).
39. Social psychology is "[a] discipline devoted to the systematic study of
human interaction and its psychological basis." KENNETH J. GERGEN & MARY M.
GERGEN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1981) (emphasis omitted). For examples of so-
cial psychological studies in the whistleblowing area in the past 10 years, see
Mary Brabeck, Ethical Characteristics of Whistle Blowers, 18 J. RES. PERSONALITY 41
(1984) (describing study intended to measure effects of moral reasoning on
11
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review of literature in this area was undertaken by legislators or
their staffs to analyze the potential effectiveness or the human and
organizational implications of financial incentive statutes. In-
deed, there is no evidence that they even realized the existence of
such data.
A review of social science research indicates that money re-
wards for whistleblowing may produce the desired result of in-
creasing the number of individuals willing to report wrongful
activity. According to the current literature, if the reward system
is structured properly, financial incentives should encourage a
new type of whistleblower to step forward. It is important to keep
in mind, however, that the social psychologists attempting to
study whistleblowing in organizations have relied heavily on case
studies or questionnaires; these methods depend primarily on
"the retrospective and one-sided view of the whistleblower," a
perspective that may lead to some bias in the reporting of the
events.40 Accordingly, the conclusions proposed below should be
considered preliminary, particularly those relying on the still-de-
veloping whistleblowing literature. Despite the dynamic aspect of
these conclusions, however, the social-psychological research
completed thus far does contribute to assessing the viability of
financial incentives for whistleblowing.
whistleblowing); John P. Keenan, Communication Climate, Whistle-blowing, and the
First-Level Manager: A Preliminary Study, 40 ACAD. MGMT. BEST PAPER PROC. 247
(1988) (presenting findings on study of whistleblowing and communication cli-
mate of organization from perspective of line manager); Marcia P. Miceli &Janet
P. Near, Characteristics of Organizational Climate and Perceived Wrongdoing Associated
with Whistle-Blowing Decisions, 38 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 525 (1985) (discussing po-
tential explanations of why some observers report organization wrongdoing
while others do not); Marcia P, Miceli & Janet P. Near, Individual and Situational
Correlates of Whistle-Blowing, 41 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 267 (1988) [hereinafter Cor-
relates of Whistle-Blowing] (analyzing effects of individual characteristics, working
environment and employer practices on employee whistleblowing); Marcia P.
Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs, Organizational Position, and
Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. MGMT. J. 687 (1984)
[hereinafter Beliefs, Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status] (examining
survey data to determine whether persons who report organizational wrongdo-
ing differ from other employees as to their beliefs about organizational condi-
tions and position); Janet P. Near & Tamila C. Jensen, The Whistleblowing Process:
Retaliation and Perceived Effectiveness, 10 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 3 (1983) (examin-
ing data on factors that motivate female employees who blew whistle on employ-
ers with regard to alleged sex discrimination);Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli,
Retaliation Against Whistle Blowers: Predictors and Effects, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
137 (1986) (examining circumstances under which whistleblower should expect
retaliation by employer); Marcia A. Parmerlee et al., Correlates of Whistle-blowers'
Perceptions of Organizational Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. ScI. Q 17 (1982) (analyzing
factors that influence organizational retaliation against public whistleblowers in
cases of alleged unfair employment discrimination).
40. Dworkin & Near, supra note 16, at 80.
284 [Vol. 37: p. 273
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A. The Potential Whistleblower
In assessing the efficacy of a reward system, the first step is to
identify the type of reward to be offered, the type of behavior
sought to be encouraged by that reward, and the likelihood that
the chosen reward will in fact encourage the desired behavior. 4'
Rewards are often classified by social scientists as either "intrin-
sic" or "extrinsic."-42 Intrinsic rewards (such as a sense of compe-
tence, the satisfaction of meeting a challenge and the opportunity
to exercise creativity) are self-administered by participation in or
accomplishment of the rewarding activity. 43 Extrinsic rewards
(i.e., money, benefits, promotions), on the other hand, depend
upon external factors. 44 Extrinsic rewards are generally more
tangible, and the satisfaction they provide is distinct from the ac-
tivity rewarded. Extrinsic rewards are often used to stimulate
41. A variety of rewards may be gained in the employment setting. See, e.g.,
CASCIO, supra note 38, at 429-30, 432 (noting that management has many power-
ful reward tools to improve employee performance, such as raises, promotions,
job performance recognition).
42. See, e.g., William W. Notz, Work Motivation and the Negative Effects of Extrin-
sic Rewards: A Review with Implications for Theory and Practice, 1975 AM. PSYCHOL.
884, 884 (discussing that many theorists and practitioners draw distinction be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and assume that both kinds of motiva-
tion are independent and additive; under this view, rewards such as pay, fringe
benefits and promotions are extrinsic, intrinsic awards are integral part of work
activity itself). It must be kept in mind, however, that not all commentators
share this classification scheme. For example, one commentator has stated that
"[a] single definition separating intrinsic and extrinsic rewards is not widely
shared among observers of work behaviors .... ." Richard A. Guzzo, Types of
Rewards, Cognitions, and Work Motivation, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 75, 75 (1979). Ac-
cording to Guzzo, making a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards
on the basis of an activity-reward relationship is unsatisfactory for two reasons:
(1) it can be indefinite and illusory-behavior apparently occurring for no re-
ward may be due to tangible awards which happen to be sporadic; and (2) it is
improper to say that an activity can be engaged in for its own sake-all activities
have consequences, but some may be private to the actor. Id. at 76.
43. See, e.g., EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 43 (1985) (describing intrinsic
motivation as "innate, natural propensity to engage one's interests and exercise
one's capacities"); LYMAN W. PORTER ET AL., BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 341-
42 (1975) (for intrinsic awards, such as feelings of competence or self-actualiza-
tion, "all the organization can do is to create conditions (e.g., particular job de-
signs) that make it possible for the individual to experience them .. .[however,
ultimately] the individual must reward himself"); Notz, supra note 42, at 884
(describing intrinsic awards as "those over which the employee has a high de-
gree of self-control and that are an integral part of the work activity itself").
44. See, e.g., PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 343 (stating that extrinsic
awards are given to or obtained by employee, and are tangible and potentially
visible to others); Notz, supra note 42, at 884 (stating that extrinsic rewards "pro-
vide satisfaction that is independent of the actual activity itself ... because they
are controlled by someone other than the employee").
1992] 285
13
Callahan and Dworkin: Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
conduct that would not otherwise be reliably exhibited. 45 In the
employment context, these extrinsic rewards are commonly uti-
lized to induce three general types of behavior: joining the or-
ganization; dependably discharging job responsibilities; and
undertaking "innovative and spontaneous activity" to achieve or-
ganizational objectives extending beyond job specifications. 46
1. Analysis of Money as a Reward
In looking at the type of reward offered by the FCA (payment
for information provided), the social-psychological literature
clearly establishes that pay, which is classified as an extrinsic re-
ward, is a potent motivational tool. 47 Nevertheless, a great deal
of research also indicates that rewards other than money are pref-
erable motivators in some, and perhaps many, circumstances be-
cause of the relationship between extrinsic rewards and intrinsic
motivation. A number of studies involving a wide array of re-
wards and situational variables have evaluated the relationship
between rewards and motivation. 48 The results of these studies
have been interpreted to establish the proposition that providing
45. See PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 342 (stating that, "[iln order to
function effectively, most work organizations need people to do tasks that in the
absence of extrinsic rewards they often would not do").
46. Daniel Katz, The Motivational Basis of Organizational Behavior, 9 BEHAV-
IORAL SCI. 131, 131-32 (1964). These three types of behavior are considered
essential to the organization. Attracting employees to join and remain with an
organization is important to ensure sufficient personnel to man the functions of
that organization and to avoid costly turnover. Id. at 132. Dependable perform-
ance is necessary so that the organization can predict and rely upon minimal
levels of production and quality. Id. Finally, an organization gains strength
through the ability of its employees to spontaneously and creatively react to un-
foreseen changes in operations and the environment. Id.; see also PORTER ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 342 (stating that organizations use extrinsic rewards to motivate
three kinds of behavior: membership, attendance and performance).
47. See, e.g., EDWARD L. DECI, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 207 (1975) (stating
that extrinsic rewards motivate behavior and often improve performance); ED-
WARD E. LAWLER III, PAY AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL VIEW 62 (1971) (stating that "pay can be and usually is important enough to
motivate most kinds ofjob behavior"); PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 352 (stat-
ing that extrinsic rewards can be used to motivate job performance); Herbert H.
Meyer, The Pay-for-Performance Dilemma, 4 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 39, 39
(1975) (stating that pay is powerful motivator for most people);John A. Wagner,
III et al., Incentive Payment and Nonmanagerial Productivity: An Interrupted Time Series
Analysis of Magnitude and Trend, 42 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 47, 47 (1988) (discussing study that examined changes in productiv-
ity after introduction of non-managerial pay incentive program).
48. See DECI & RYAN, supra note 43, at 44-48 (summarizing numerous stud-
ies on effects of monetary rewards on intrinsic motivation); Guzzo, supra note 42,
at 79-81 (synthesizing results of 30 studies on relationship between extrinsic and
intrinsic rewards).
286 [Vol. 37: p. 273
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an extrinsic reward for the accomplishment of an intrinsically re-
warding activity has a negative effect on the intrinsic motivation
for that task.49
This effect has been explained in terms of "cognitive evalua-
tion theory," a theory which focuses on the origins of motivation
for behavior. 50 The hypothesis is that "intrinsically motivated be-
havior" has an internal source or causation-a person does the
task for internal rewards such as interest in or mastery of the
task. 5' In comparison, "extrinsically motivated behavior" has an
external source or causation-the person does the task to obtain a
reward or to comply with an external constraint. 52 Thus, an ex-
trinsically motivated activity is pursued as "a means to an end
rather than an end in itself."53 Under cognitive evaluation the-
49. See DECI & RYAN, supra note 43, at 47-48 (discussing studies demon-
strating that "when subjects received monetary rewards for working on a variety
of activities, under a variety of circumstances in and out of the laboratory, their
intrinsic motivation for the rewarded activity decreased"). For example, Deci
found in one study that research subjects who were paid for working on an in-
trinsically interesting activity (in this case solving puzzles) were less intrinsically
motivated after being paid for solving the puzzles in the allotted time than were
the subjects who had done the same activity without pay. Id. at 47. Another
study showed that paying male teenage subjects for working on a mechanical
assembly task decreased the subjects' satisfaction. Id. at 48. From these studies,
the researchers concluded: "Evidence that extrinsic rewards ... can undermine
intrinsic motivation is quite persuasive." Id. at 51. According to Deci and Ryan,
this "phenomenon has appeared with ages ranging from preschoolers to adults,
rewards ranging from money to marshmallows, activities ranging from solving
puzzles to beating a drum, settings ranging from psychology laboratories to a
newspaper office, and cultures ranging from the United States to Japan." Id.; see
also Meyer, supra note 47, at 41 (citing Deci's conclusion that "to the extent pay
is attached directly to the performance of the task, intrinsic interest in the task
itself decreases").
50. According to Deci and Ryan:
With an external reward or constraint, an instrumentality develops such
that the activity becomes a means to an end rather than an end in itself.
The behavior is no longer something that is done because it is interest-
ing; it is something that is done to get an external reward or to comply
with an external constraint. This statement about the change in per-
ceived locus of causality became part of what Deci (1975) referred to as
cognitive evaluation theory.
DECI & RYAN, supra note 43, at 49.
51. Id. (stating that "intrinsically motivated behavior has an internal per-
ceived locus of causality").
52. Id. (stating that "extrinsically motivated behavior has an external per-
ceived locus of causality").
53. Id. Other theorists agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Notz, supra note
42, at 884-85 (citing and expanding on similar hypothesis of deCharms).
[D]eCharms hypothesized that when a man perceives his behavior as
stemming from his own choice (i.e., sees himself as an origin), he will
cherish that behavior and its results; when he perceives his behavior as
stemming from external forces (i.e., sees himself as a pawn), that be-
1992] 287
15
Callahan and Dworkin: Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
288 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 273
ory, therefore, rewarding an intrinsically motivated activity extrin-
sically has the effect of shifting toward the external an otherwise
internal source of motivation.54 The practical consequences of
this phenomenon could have a significant impact on employees.
As a result of offering extrinsic rewards for performance of intrin-
sically motivated activities, rewarded activities could become less
interesting, less enjoyable and less persistently pursued. 55
havior and its results, though identical in other respects to behavior of
his own choosing, will be devalued.
DeCharms used the origin-pawn dimension to distinguish between
intrinsically versus extrinsically motivated behavior. A person is said to
be intrinsically motivated whenever he experiences himself as the locus
of causality for his own behavior (i.e., when he sees himself as an ori-
gin). Conversely, he considers himself extrinsically motivated when he
perceives the locus of causality for his behavior as external to himself
(i.e., when he perceives himself as a pawn).
Id.
54. DECI & RYAN, supra note 43, at 49 (stating that "intrinsic motivation is
based in the need to be self-determining[;] ... rewards, which are widely used as
instruments of control, can often co-opt people's self-determination and initiate
different motivational processes"). This conclusion, that intrinsically appealing
activities are generally made less so when they are extrinsically rewarded, is not,
however, universally shared. See, e.g., Guzzo, supra note 42, at 78 ("Since ...
[accompanying table summarizing results of 30 studies] reveals a substantial mix
of support and refutation for the proposition that extrinsic rewards diminish the
effects of intrinsic rewards, it is evident that the general proposition cannot be
accepted."); W. Clay Hamner, How to Ruin Motivation With Pay, 7 COMPENSATION
REV. 17, 24 (1975) (concluding that Deci's "results don't appear to completely
support his conclusion about the effect of money as a motivator"; other research
has shown that "effect of intrinsic and extrinsic monetary rewards are additive").
55. DECI & RYAN, supra note 43, at 57. Research shows that extrinsic re-
wards affect people's experience of self-determination and can induce "a decre-
ment in intrinsic motivation for the target behavior, less persistence at the
activity in the absence of external contingencies, and less interest in and enjoy-
ment of the activity." Id. It also "appears that when the expression of an atti-
tude becomes instrumental to reward attainment, one's commitment to the
attitude is weakened." Id. at 69. This second point is illustrated by a hypotheti-
cal person who attempts to persuade a neighbor to support a referendum to
prevent the construction of a highway through a game preserve. Id. The beliefs
of an environmental conservationist in support of the referendum, according to
this theory, would be weakened if he or she were hired by an association to
campaign for the referendum, because the beliefs would now be asserted for
financial gain as opposed to personal conviction. Id. Deci and Ryan further as-
sert that "the person would become less favorable toward the espoused posi-
tion, because he would not need to hold to the attitude to justify the behavior
and because people are often paid as a way of getting them to do things they do
not believe in." Id.
Deci and Ryan offer two studies in support of this proposition. In the first
study by Benware and Deci in 1975, two groups were asked to argue in favor of a
position they believed in (knowledge of the belief was pre-determined). Id. One
of the group was paid; the other was not. Id. The study showed a significant
change in attitudes away from the espoused position for the paid group com-
pared to the unpaid group. Id. In the second study, done by Kiesler and
Sakamura in 1966, the researchers found that being paid to espouse a belief one
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Thus, because of this interplay between extrinsic rewards and
intrinsic motivation, it is useful when considering motivational
schemes to categorize conduct sought to be encouraged by a re-
ward system as either a short-term, single instance activity or a
long-range, continuing behavior. 56 Extrinsic rewards, such as
money, may be useful with reference to the first type of conduct if
a possible concomitant decrease in intrinsic motivation is not a
concern. As to desired long-range behavior, the use of such in-
centives may be detrimental.
2. Employee Reaction to Money Rewards for Performance
While it appears that payment for performance under the
already held made the beliefs "more vulnerable to change during a subsequent
period when [the subjects] . . . read an argument that was counter to their be-
liefs." Id.
This analysis provides a possible explanation for the apparently contradic-
tory results of two recent long-term studies of performance-driven pay systems.
The first, analyzing managerial performance, concluded that implementing a
performance-driven plan had no measurable impact on performance trends.
Jone L. Pearce et al., Managerial Compensation Based on Organizational Performance:
A Time Series Analysis of the Effects of Merit Pay, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 261, 271 (1985)
(studying effects of tying managerial pay to organizational performance in Social
Security Administration). The second study, however, demonstrated "that the
introduction of nonmanagerial incentive payments in a unionized iron foundry
led to a significant long-term increase in productivity relative to the level ob-
served under flat-rate wages." Wagner et al., supra note 47, at 64-65. The con-
trast in the results of the two studies can perhaps be explained by the fact that, in
general, management positions are characterized by variety and flexibility, and
thus may be expected to be intrinsically rewarding. See Pearce et al., supra, at
262. Production jobs, on the other hand, are likely to be monotonous and con-
trolled. See id. Accordingly, Deci's theory would predict the outcome suggested
by these studies, i.e., that a performance-contingent pay scheme would be more
effective for production workers, who were not intrinsically rewarded by their
jobs, than for managerial employees who are more likely to be intrinsically moti-
vated. See also Charles N. Greene & Phillip M. Podsakoff, Effects of Removal of a
Pay Incentive: A Field Experiment, 1978 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 206 (discussing study
of management and non-management employees that revealed performance de-
cline among latter, but not former, group when performance-driven pay system
was removed).
56. See DECI & RYAN, supra note 43, at 208-09 (stating that, because
"[r]ewards affect performance and intrinsic motivation differently," it is impor-
tant to distinguish whether goal is immediate performance or maintenance of
intrinsic motivation; if main concern is performance, extrinsic rewards may be
very effective). As Professor Deci notes:
If one is trying to motivate a person to engage in a particular activ-
ity on a one-shot basis and is not concerned with the person's intrinsic
motivation for the activity, the extrinsic-rewards route may be the best
one to travel. Further, since extrinsic rewards have been shown to be
effective motivators, it would seem that extrinsic control systems would
be appropriate so long as the system remains operative, that is, so long
as the rewards never stop, quality is rigidly controlled, etc.
Id. at 208.
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right circumstances may encourage the desired behavior, another
consideration must be kept in mind-employees do not necessar-
ily react positively to performance reward schemes. Studies in
this area indicate serious problems that should be addressed
before such a scheme is put in place. For example, a reward sys-
tem that engenders competition among participants may have
negative consequences more direct than decreased intrinsic moti-
vation. Interpersonal relationships, and thus organizational effec-
tiveness, may suffer due to increased antagonism and decreased
contact and communication among the competing employees. 57
Additionally, the use of performance-contingent rewards can
have an impact on the self-esteem of eligible individuals. Studies
indicate that self-appraisals ofjob performance are typically quite
exaggerated. 58 If this is so, there will be a significant gap between
the (unreasonably high) expectations of most employees and the
reality of the reward in a merit-driven pay system. Such employ-
ees are likely to feel that this gap is unjustified. 59 A second, re-
lated, concern also arises from the truism that it is only possible
for some persons to receive above-average rewards. The poten-
tially amotivating signal given to the balance of the pool of eligi-
ble individuals is that they are not performing well. 60
Further, a system of monetary rewards for behavior necessar-
ily involves the designation of the activity or performance to be
rewarded by the person providing the reward. This may explain,
at least in part, studies demonstrating that employees do not view
merit compensation plans as desirable. 6' Not only does research
addressing performance-based pay systems raise serious ques-
57. Meyer, supra note 47, at 42. According to Professor Meyer, forcing em-
ployees to compete for awards can generate several types of reactions: (1) hos-
tility between employees because competitors are seen as enemies; (2) distorted
perceptions of oneself and others; and (3) decreased interaction and communi-
cation with others. Id. Because organizations require integration of efforts to
function effectively, these types of reactions are generally detrimental to the or-
ganization. Id.
58. Id. at 42-44. Professor Meyer presented a tabular summary of the re-
sults of several such surveys. Id. at 44. Asked to compare their job performance
with others doing similar work, 72% and 68% of different groups of blue collar
workers, 86% of engineers in a research laboratory, and 77% of accountants in
several companies rated themselves in the top 10% or top 25%. Id.
59. Id. (stating that most employees think they are above-average perform-
ers, however most do not receive salary increases reflecting superior perform-
ance and they therefore "feel discriminated against because it appears from pay
raises that management does not recognize their true worth").
60. See DEci & RYAN, supra note 43, at 3 10-11.
61. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 159-62 (stating that "studies indicate that
workers are less favorably disposed toward merit pay plans than are managers");
Meyer, supra note 47, at 40 (noting that, despite belief that it is based on sound
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tions about managers' abilities to objectively evaluate their em-
ployees, there is also evidence that few workers believe that
managers are capable of identifying legitimate differences among
the performances rendered by subordinates. 62 In addition, some
reward systems based on performance may be perceived as
demeaning in the sense that they require dependence on the
rewarder. 63
3. Individual Characteristics and the Effectiveness of Money Rewards
Another factor must also be kept in mind-how an em-
ployee's individual characteristics might affect his or her view of
money as a reward for behavior. On an individual basis, money
will affect motivation to the extent that money is valued by that
person. Several studies have analyzed the relationship between
the priority given to pay and sex, age, education and level of self-
esteem. These studies suggest that men value pay more highly
than women, that the importance of pay declines as age advances,
and that no demonstrable relationship exists between education
level and the significance of pay.64 The studies also indicate, pre-
principle, merit pay system "contributes little or nothing to employee satisfac-
tion with pay").
62. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 168 (stating that subordinates often see
subjective appraisal systems as arbitrary and unfair; objective systems can fail to
reflect individual efforts); PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 321 (stating that
"[s]tudy after study has shown that the typical performance evaluation ratings
done by a superior tend to be suspect"); Hamner, supra note 54, at 19 (noting
that even managers working under merit program believed to be good are dis-
satisfied with performance evaluation by superiors); Meyer, supra note 47, at 41
(noting that validity of assumption that supervisor can make objective, valid dis-
tinctions between employees' performances is often questioned; most unionized
employees do not accept validity of supervisor judgments). But see Lee Dyer et
al., Managerial Perceptions Regarding Salary Increase Criteria, 29 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL.
233, 240 (1976) (finding that managerial survey respondents believe perform-
ance is important factor in determining their own salary increases, but organiza-
tions do not place as much emphasis on this criterion as they should).
63. See Hamner, supra note 54, at 19 (stating that manager's role in deter-
mining pay reminds employee that he or she is dependent on manager for re-
wards); Meyer, supra note 47, at 41 (stating that merit pay can be viewed as
demeaning because of implication that employee must please "big daddy boss"
in order to receive rewards boss deems appropriate). This difficulty would not
arise, however, where objective criteria for the reward have been established.
See Meyer, supra note 47, at 42 (stating that "[a] merit pay plan based on objec-
tive criteria, such as commissions on sales, does not have this paternalistic
character").
64. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 47-49, 51. According to Lawler, "studies
are quite consistent in showing that pay is more important to men than to wo-
men." Id. at 47. His own research showed "a tendency for women to rate pay as
significantly less important, even when they are heads of households." Id. From
this, Lawler concluded that "it is not simply a lack of economic necessity that
1992]
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liminarily, that greater emphasis is placed on pay by individuals
who have low self-esteem. 65
Individual, but employment-related, characteristics such as
job level and pay level have also been studied.66 In general, the
research suggests an inverse relationship between both job and
pay levels and the value placed on pay. 67
4. Implications for Whistleblowing Rewards
While extrinsic rewards are often utilized to stimulate per-
formance, the question remains whether the potential benefits of
using money (an extrinsic reward) as an incentive for blowing the
whistle on wrongful conduct (the desired performance) outweigh
the likely drawbacks. In an effort to address this query, the fol-
lowing discussion integrates the social-psychological research on
whistleblowing with the rewards literature previously
summarized. 68
causes women to rate pay as less important, but rather the relationship of pay to
their needs and goals." Id.
With reference to age and pay, Lawler discussed three studies that found a
negative relationship and one study which found no relationship. Id. at 48. At
this point, however, Lawler found no definitive explanation for why pay might
decrease in importance as age increases. Id. at 49.
Lawler also concluded that education level and pay are probably not re-
lated. Id. at 51. He came to this conclusion in spite of two studies which showed
"that more highly educated people place more importance on pay than do less
highly educated people." Id. For Lawler, because "it is not obvious that educa-
tion substantially affects the strength of needs or the perceived instrumentalities
of pay for satisfying needs," there is no "obvious reason why educational level
should have any such effect." Id. Lawler also noted that a 1954 study reported
no difference in groups with different education levels with respect to impor-
tance attached to pay. Id.
65. Id. at 49. Lawler concluded that, because "pay is probably seen as in-
strumental for the satisfaction of esteem and security needs," it is likely that
"pay is more important to employees who, presumably, wish to bolster their
self-assurance." Id.
66. Id. at 51-55.
67. Id. According to Lawler, there is a good deal of evidence showing that,
"as one considers higher and higher levels within an organization, pay becomes
less important." Id. at 53. For example, one study showed that skilled blue-
collar workers rated pay as less important than did unskilled blue-collar workers.
Id. Another study reported that lower-level managers rated pay as more impor-
tant than middle-level managers. Id. A third study found the same as between
middle-level and top-level managers. Id. at 53-54.
Lawler also concluded that "high pay satisfaction can lead to a reduction in
the importance of pay." Id. at 52. As Lawler cautioned, however, there is not
much data in this area and the evidence thus far "is only a start in showing how
the amount of pay influences its importance to employees but the evidence sup-
porting some of the relationships is impressive." Id.
68. For a discussion of the "rewards" literature, see supra notes 38-67 and
accompanying text.
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a. Relationship Between Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic
Motivation
Social-psychological research on whistleblowing indicates
that an individual who reports wrongful conduct is typically
prompted to do so by organizational loyalty; the employee acts
with the primary objective of benefitting the organization. 69
These are intrinsic motivations, similar to meeting a challenge or
achieving a sense of competence. 70 If the use of extrinsic rewards
does, in fact, have a detrimental effect on intrinsic motivation, of-
fering monetary incentives for reporting wrongful conduct may
reduce prospective whistleblowers' loyalty-driven impulses to
take the same action. 7 1 Because encouraging whistleblowing is
likely a long-term and continuing goal, this detrimental effect
could be a significant disadvantage to offering monetary rewards
for making such disclosures.
Evidence suggests, however, that most observations of
wrongdoing are not reported. 72 This fact may support the use of
monetary incentives for whistleblowing. Extrinsic rewards are
commonly and effectively used to encourage action that would
not otherwise be taken.73 Thus, the potential decrease in
whistleblowing resulting from a reduction of intrinsic motivation
among individuals who would blow the whistle without a money
reward may be more than offset by an increased rate of disclosure
by persons who would not blow the whistle in the absence of such
an incentive.74
69. See Miceli & Near, Correlates of Whistle-Blowing, supra note 39, at 269. Ac-
cording to Miceli and Near, "[a]lthough it is often assumed that whistle-blowers
are disloyal to or dissatisfied with their organizations, the opposite may in fact be
true: they act precisely because they believe it to be in the long-term best inter-
ests of the organization ... and of other individuals." Id. (citation omitted).
70. For a discussion of intrinsic motivations, see supra note 43 and accom-
panying text.
71. For a discussion of the potential impact of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic
motivation, see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
72. See MARCIA P. MICELI &JANET P. NEAR, WHISTLE-BLOWING IN ORGANIZA-
TIONS, 93-135 (1992) (discussing research on and reasons for who blows whistle
and who does not).
73. For a discussion of the use of extrinsic rewards to influence behavior,
see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
74. The relationship between financial rewards and whistleblowing has re-
ceived little attention in the social-psychological literature to date. See MICELI &
NEAR, supra note 72, at 153-54 (stating that "there is little evidence that [cash]
incentives offered by organizations are effective [in encouraging internal
whistleblowing] primarily because little investigation has been conducted into
incentive programs"). The little research available, however, does not support
this hypothesis. For instance, only one respondent in a study of first-level man-
agers indicated that a monetary reward would be the best way to encourage such
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Other considerations suggest that rewards may have little
negative impact on the intrinsically-motivated whistleblower.
Participation in a reward system such as that created by the False
Claims Act is voluntary and must be aggressively pursued-in
contrast to most extrinsic rewards in organizational compensation
systems. Further, whistleblowers motivated by the desire to bene-
fit the organization are unlikely to pursue FCA actions because of
the potential of such lawsuits to subject their organization to
large losses. Thus, individuals who are intrinsically motivated to
blow the whistle may be only minimally affected by the availability
of financial incentives.
b. Responses of Person Rewarded
Other concerns about common employee responses to mon-
etary incentives may be less troublesome in the context of re-
wards for whistleblowing than in other situations for several
reasons. First, the performance to be rewarded under such a
scheme-that is, blowing the whistle on the wrongful activity of
another individual or group-can be objectively evaluated. Either
the disclosure is made or it is not. Thus, questions regarding
managers' abilities to accurately assess and distinguish among
employees' performances should not arise. 75 Similarly, potential
feelings of discrimination, based on unrealistic perceptions of in-
dividual accomplishment in comparison to others, are not likely
to occur. 76 In addition, because of the objective nature of the cri-
teria for a whistleblowing reward, the potentially demeaning need
to please a superior does not exist. 77
Second, the ability to blow the whistle usually depends more
upon an accident of access than on diligence or competence. 78
disclosures. Keenan, supra note 39, at 249. Professor Keenan's study indicated
that the factor most likely to encourage a report of wrongful conduct was the
knowledge that corrective action would be taken. Id.; see also Miceli & Near, Be-
liefs, Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status, supra note 39, at 700 (dis-
cussing survey in which respondents who blew whistle within organization
reported that "environmental incentives" such as cash did not influence their
decisions to disclose, but "providing convincing evidence that corrective action
would be taken appear[ed] to be important to nearly all potential whistle-
blowers").
75. For a discussion of the concerns of subjective evaluation for extrinsic
rewards, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the impact of employees' perception of their job
performance on employee motivation, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text.
77. For a discussion of the potential demeaning quality of a reward system,
see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
78. Generally, the opportunity to become a whistleblower arises when an
294 [Vol. 37: p. 273
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Therefore, money awards for whistleblowing should not discour-
age individuals who do not receive them, in the sense that below-
average merit-based compensation can. 79 This "accident of ac-
cess" factor also renders unlikely the negative interpersonal con-
sequences that can arise from performance-driven reward systems
that engender competition among participants.8
c. Relationship Between Effectiveness of Money Rewards and
Characteristics of Rewardee
As previously discussed, social-psychological research sug-
gests that the motivational potential of financial incentives varies
in relation to individual characteristics such as sex, age, education
level, and personality traits. 8 ' Several of these variables have
been examined specifically in terms of the propensity of employ-
ees to blow the whistle. An assessment of the rewards literature
in combination with the whistleblowing data suggests that older
persons are more likely to blow the whistle, whereas younger in-
dividuals might be more susceptible to financial incentives.
8 2
Similarly, it is hypothesized that higher levels of self-esteem are
positively related to whistleblowing, whereas persons with low
self-esteem are more likely to value pay.8 3 Given that extrinsic
rewards may be used successfully to engender conduct that might
not be pursued without such incentives, a tentative conclusion
may be drawn that whistleblowing by younger persons and indi-
viduals with low self-esteem might be effectively encouraged
through the use of money rewards.8 4
individual observes, by chance, the wrongful activity of another. An employee's
job performance, on the other hand, is largely determined by that individual's
capabilities and industriousness.
79. For a discussion of the potentially discouraging effect of rewards, see
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of the negative interpersonal consequences and the
resulting impact on the organization, see supra note 57 and accompanying text;
cf infra notes 244-52 and accompanying text (discussing other potential negative
organizational consequences).
81. For a discussion of these characteristics in relation to extrinsic reward
systems, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
82. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 48-49 (stating that importance of pay de-
creases as age increases); MICELI & NEAR, supra note 72, 115-17 (discussing rea-
sons why younger employees are less likely to blow whistle).
83. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 49 (noting that pay is more important to
employees who want to boost self-esteem); MICELI & NEAR, supra note 72, at 109
(discussing research that proposed that self-esteem is positively related to whis-
tle-blowing). This hypothesis, however, has not yet been tested empirically. Id.
at 110.
84. Under this analysis, information regarding two other variables consid-
ered by scholars of reward theory and whistleblowing is of limited usefulness to
23
Callahan and Dworkin: Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Likewise, research focusing on work-related personal charac-
teristics indicates that rewards may spur whistleblowing among
lower level employees who might not otherwise disclose wrong-
doing. This conclusion is drawn from studies done on the types
of employees likely to blow the whistle without that additional fi-
nancial incentive and the types of employees likely to respond
positively to a financial incentive. Studies on whistleblowing have
revealed that certain categories of whistleblowers typically occupy
supervisory positions. 85 Another finding is that those who make
such disclosures, outside the organization at least, tend to be
long-term employees.8 6 In light of the studies revealing that the
value placed by an individual on pay tends to decrease as his or
her job and pay levels rise, money rewards may effectively en-
courage employees with certain characteristics-such as low pay
and job status, and short tenure in the position-to report wrong-
ful activity where they might have otherwise remained silent.87
B. Reward Administration and Structure
In terms of individual characteristics, the social-psychological
literature supports the assumption that financial incentives will
motivate new whistleblowers to come forward. Other considera-
tions, however, also have a crucial bearing on the overall success
of such a scheme. The effectiveness of extrinsic rewards in a
given context, therefore, must also be evaluated in light of the
a decision on whether or not to use money rewards to encourage whistleblow-
ing. With reference to sex, men are both more responsive to financial incentives
and more likely to blow the whistle. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 47 (noting that
pay is more important to men than to women); MICELI & NEAR, supra note 72, at
120-23 (discussing research on and reasons why men are more likely to blow
whistle than women). Thus, extrinsic rewards should not be particularly useful
in encouraging whistleblowing among women. Educational level, on the other
hand, has not been shown to have a relationship to the value given to pay in the
rewards literature, although preliminary evidence indicates that more highly ed-
ucated persons are more likely to blow the whistle. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at
51 (noting that education and importance of pay are most likely not related);
MICELI & NEAR, supra note 72, at 119-20 (discussing research on and reasons
why education level has some effect on whistleblowing).
85. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 72, at 125 (discussing research on and
reasons why supervisory status has effect on whistleblowing).
86. See id. at 117-19 (discussing research on and reasons why length of ser-
vice has effect on whistleblowing); Dworkin & Near, supra note 16, at 78 (stating
that "whistleblowers seemed to be long-term employees who had shown a his-
tory of loyalty to the employer through their lengthy tenure"); Miceli & Near,
Beliefs, Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status, supra note 39, at 700-01
(describing characteristics of whistleblowers who utilize external channels).
87. For a discussion of these studies, see supra notes 64-67 and accompany-
ing text.
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characteristics of the organization or entity granting the award
and the structure of the reward itself.8 8
1. Characteristics of Reward Administration
The nature of the environment within which a reward system
operates is a critical factor in determining its potential efficacy.8 9
Further, in contrast to the personal characteristics of the potential
reward recipient, organizational factors can be changed in order
to maximize the potential effectiveness of rewards. The motiva-
tional potency of a reward depends on the clarity of its link to the
conduct sought to be induced. 90 Accordingly, money is unlikely
88. The significance of organizational characteristics and reward structure
to the success of a pay-for-performance scheme is illustrated by a synthesis of 98
published productivity studies. See Richard A. Guzzo et al., The Effects of Psycho-
logically Based Intervention Programs on Worker Productivity: A Meta-Analysis, 38 PER-
SONNEL PSYCHOL. 275, 280 (1985). The authors analyzed the effect of 11 types
of "intervention programs," including financial incentive programs, to deter-
mine their relative impact on productivity. Id. at 277-78. The authors character-
ized as "surprising" their failure to identify a statistically significant effect of
money incentives on productivity, but explained:
[T]he variance in the effects of financial compensation was the greatest
among all the programs. In some applications, financial incentives had
very powerful effects on productivity, but there were other instances of
negligible effects. Apparently the effects of incentive programs depend
heavily on the circumstances and methods of applying them ....
Id. at 285. Accordingly, the authors "sound[] a warning that [financial] incentive
schemes have traps for the unwary or unsophisticated .... On the other hand,
when applied in the right way and in the right situations, they can have strongly
positive effects on productivity, especially on output." Id. at 289.
89. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 55-56 (discussing evidence that "pay is
more important to people who work in profit-making business organizations
than to those who work in non-profit organizations"); PORTER ET AL., supra note
43, at 363 (noting that reward plans which work in small, democratically-
managed organizations may not work in large, autocratically-managed
organizations).
90. See, e.g., LAWLER, supra note 47, at 257-58 (stating that pay should be
closely tied to performance); PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 354 (stating that
for reward to be motivator it must be tied to measured performance); Katz, supra
note 46, at 140 (stating that if rewards are to work as intended, they must follow
performance and must be perceived (1) as large enough to justify additional
effort required, (2) as directly related to required performance, and (3) as equi-
table). Recognition of high levels of performance can also have negative conse-
quences, however, such as social ostracism. See PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at
361-63 (evaluating pay plans on ability to minimize negative consequences in-
cluding ostracism; ostracism occurs most often with individual bonus and piece-
rate payment plans). This result has been demonstrated in the context of piece-
work pay schemes involving production workers. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at
124-26 (discussing fact that, although little evidence exists to show how employ-
ees' beliefs develop, studies show that workers placed on individual piece-rate
plans often feel "negative social and economic consequences will result if they
are highly productive"). These negative beliefs can be minimized, however, if
the system is viewed as fair by most of the individuals who are eligible for re-
wards, including those who do not receive them. See Katz, supra note 46, at 140
19921 297
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to motivate behavior where individual performance is not suscep-
tible to objective measurement by the organization-where it is
not clear exactly what type of conduct will be rewarded. 91 Fur-
ther, motivation can be affected by the timeliness of the reward. 92
Additionally, performance-driven rewards are most useful in
situations where information about their calculation and alloca-
tion can be disseminated. 93 In the absence of such disclosure, it is
difficult to demonstrate to employees that significant financial re-
wards can, in fact, be acquired by those who perform well.9 4 The
amount of the reward is also relevant, in that the reward is a mo-
tivator only if it is perceived as sufficiently substantial to justify
the required effort.95 Finally, employee participation in the de-
(stating that pay incentive rewards can work if majority of employees, many of
whom won't receive rewards, perceive rewards as equitable). Perceptions of a
strong, objectively demonstrable link between performance and reward may be
the best antidote. A high level of organizational trust and positive interpersonal
relationships between managers and employees provides a helpful framework
for this link, See DEcI & RYAN, supra note 43, at 301-04 (discussing evidence
showing that interpersonal context within which rewards and communications
occur affects employees' motivation); Katz, supra note 46, at 144 (stating that,
because we are social animals, approval and support from interacting is potent
form of motivation); LAWLER, supra note 47, at 172 (showing graph of relation-
ship between trust, objectivity of criteria and success of reward program; high
levels of trust and objectivity create greatest likelihood for success).
91. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 174 (discussing studies showing that "ac-
curate feedback about quality of work is a strong stimulus to good perform-
ance"; concluding that "[p]eople work better when they know how well they are
doing in relation to some meaningful standard"); PORTER ET AL., supra note 43,
at 354, 364 (stating that, for any reward to be motivator, it must be tied to per-
formance and performance must be measured; if performance cannot be objec-
tively measured, it is better not to use extrinsic reward as motivator). But see
Donald P. Schwab & Craig A. Olson, Merit Pay Practices: Implications for Pay-Per-
formance Relationships, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 237-S, 250-S to 251-S (1990)
(stating that while measurement error in evaluation of employees' performance
attenuates relationship between performance and pay, it has only modest effect
on that relationship).
92. See Hamner, supra note 54, at 19 (stating that, where time horizon for
reward is long (i.e., deferred payments), employee can lose sight of relationship
of reward to performance); Katz, supra note 46, at 140 (rewards, to work as in-
tended, should follow directly on accomplishment of desired performance).
93. PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 354-56 (discussing existence of evi-
dence that keeping basis for pay raise secret may increase employee dissatisfac-
tion and make it more difficult to use pay as motivator); see also Hamner, supra
note 54, at 19-20 (stating that, when pay increases are kept secret, employees
can draw erroneous conclusions about perceived level of equality or esteem).
94. PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 356 (discussing study which showed
significant increase in employees' perceptions of degree to which pay and per-
formance were related after company became less secretive about pay).
95. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 173 (stating that "[liarge amounts of
money must be given to the good performers if employees are to place a high
value on good performance and the raises to which it leads"); Katz, supra note
46, at 140 (stating that pay rewards, in order to work, "must be clearly perceived
298 [Vol. 37: p. 273
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velopment of the reward structure can also have a critical impact
on its success. 96
2. Reward Structure
The structure of the reward system, aside from the context in
which the system operates, also influences its efficacy. The prob-
lem here, however, is that no single scheme appears to be able to
meet successfully all motivational objectives. For example, one
study compared different types of reward systems and rated those
plans in terms of their effectiveness in creating the perception
that pay was tied to performance, their minimization of the per-
ceived negative consequences of good performance, and their
contribution to the perception that important rewards other than
pay stem from good performance. 97 With respect to tying pay to
performance, individual plans were rated the highest. 98 Group
plans were rated the lowest. 99 In addition, bonus plans were
rated higher than pay raise plans.' 00 Further, plans which used
as large enough in amount to justify the additional effort required to obtain
them").
96. Katz, supra note 46, at 144 (discussing finding that one way for employ-
ees to become committed to goals of organization is participation by employees
in decisions about group objectives); Edward E. Lawler III& J. Richard Hack-
man, Impact of Employee Participation in the Development of Pay Incentive Plans: A Field
Experiment, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 467, 470-71 (1969) (discussing study which
suggested that employee participation in plan development may have greater
impact on effectiveness of plan than mechanics of plan itself).
97. LAWLER, supra note 47, at 164-70 (evaluating different approaches to
merit-based pay and concluding that "it is vital to fit the pay plan to the organi-
zation"). The plans were evaluated using combinations of three sets of vari-
ables: (1) compensation in the form of salary versus bonuses; (2) payments
given to individuals, groups, or the organization as a whole; and (3) perform-
ance, measured in terms of productivity, cost effectiveness and supervisors' eval-
uations. Id. at 164-65. According to Lawler, evaluating a plan "in terms of how
effective it is in creating the perception that pay is tied to performance ... indi-
cates the degree to which the approach actualy [sic] ties pay closely to perform-
ance, chronologically speaking, and the degree to which employees believe that
higher pay will follow good performance." Id. at 164. Evaluation "in terms of
how well [the plan] .. .minimizes the perceived negative consequences of good
performance . . .[looks to] the extent to which the approach eliminates situa-
tions where social ostracism and other negative consequences become associ-
ated with good performance." Id. at 164-65.
98. Id. at 165.
99. Id. According to Lawler, this trend reflects the fact that, in group and
organization-wide plans, "an individual's pay is not directly a function of his own
behavior." Id.
100. Id. at 164-65. Bonuses, unlike pay raises, can be tied to recent behav-
ior of employees. Id. at 166. With a bonus, an employee's reward can differ
significantly from year to year, depending on that year's performance. Id. With
a pay raise, however, because organizations generally do not cut pay, pay raises
most often reflect performance over a number of years. Id.
1992] 299
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objective measures of performance were rated higher than those
which used subjective measures.' 0 ' The ratings differed signifi-
cantly for the other criteria. While the ability to minimize nega-
tive outcomes related to high performance was generally rated as
neutral in most plans, it was rated negatively in individual bonus
plans.' 0 2 In addition, the ratings for tying non-pay rewards to
performance were also higher for the group and organizational
plans. 0 3
Perhaps the most important generalization to be drawn from
this evidence is that no single reward scheme can successfully sat-
isfy all objectives.10 4 More specifically, the strongest tie between
performance and pay seems to be achieved by the use of individ-
ual bonuses calculated on the basis of objective criteria. 0 5 Yet
individual bonuses are not the ultimate solution. They seem to
have a deleterious effect on employees' perceptions of autonomy
and control and, at the same time, they can engender peer pres-
sure to limit productivity.' 06 Group and organizational plans, in-
101. Id. at 166. For example, employees are generally more willing to trust
objective measures, such as sales or units produced, over unverifiable subjective
measures, such as managers' ratings. Id.
102. Id. Lawler concluded that this rating "reflects the fact that piece rate
plans often lead to situations in which social rejection, firing, and running out of
work are perceived by individuals to result from good performance." Id. Thus,
under this type of system, "the perceived negative consequences of good per-
formance may cancel out the positive motivational force that piece rate plans
typically generate by tying pay closely to performance." Id.
103. Id. Because, under these types of plans, it benefits everyone when an
individual performs well, "good performance is much more likely to be seen to
result in esteem, respect, and social acceptance, than it is under individual
plans." Id.
104. See id. at 167 (because "no one pay plan is strong in all areas," no one
type of pay plan provides the ultimate solution for employee motivation
problems); PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 360-61 (evaluating any number of
thousands of pay plans that have been designed "illustrates the impossibility of
developing an extrinsic reward system that is strong in all respects").
105. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 165-66; PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at
362 (evaluating trends that show that individual bonuses have greatest effect on
motivation because they are directly equated to employee's recent performance,
and that objective measures enjoy highest levels of credibility); see also Lawrence
M. Kahn & Peter D. Sherer, Contingent Pay and Managerial Performance, 43 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 107-S, 117-S to 118-S (1990) (stating that study of managers in
mid-sized manufacturing company demonstrated that bonuses, but not merit in-
creases to base salary, influenced performance); Katz, supra note 46, at 138 (stat-
ing that system rewards, in contrast to individual rewards "will not ... lead to
higher quality of work or greater quantity than the minimum required to stay in
the organization"). But see Schwab & Olson, supra note 91, at 249-S to 251-S
(stating that study of entry level through middle managers, professional and
technical employees suggested that merit-driven increases in base pay effectively
link pay to performance over longer term).
106. See PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 114 (stating that "feeling of per-
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volving payment in the form of either salary or bonuses, would
appear to address most effectively the goal of linking high per-
formance to non-monetary rewards such as peer acceptance and
recognition. '0 7
3. Implications for Whistleblowing Rewards
The research on reward structure and administration seems
to indicate that rewarding whistleblowing should be an effective
means of encouraging that behavior. Blowing the whistle is an
objectively quantifiable act. A monetary reward for blowing the
whistle, which clearly establishes a tie between pay and perform-
ance, could thus be characterized as an individual bonus based on
objective criteria. Accordingly, because the rewarding organiza-
tion can establish that connection between the reward and the de-
sired performance, the probability that a monetary incentive will
motivate whistleblowing is high.' 0 8 This probability will be maxi-
mized where the rewards are sizeable, made in a timely manner
and publicized.' 0 9 Other reward administration considerations
sonal control and autonomy in one's work" is sometimes relinquished by em-
ployee for reward plans to work, resulting in unwillingness "to participate fully
and honestly in the plans"); LAWLER, supra note 47, at 124-26 (discussing studies
showing that workers on individual incentive plans establish quotas below maxi-
mum production capabilities and anyone who produces more could be ostra-
cized or physically punished); see also Hamner, supra note 54, at 20-21 (noting
relative advantage of group or company-wide plan to avoid decreased coopera-
tion among employees).
107. See LAWLER, supra note 47, at 166 (noting that, under group and orga-
nizational plans, all group members benefit from strong individual perform-
ances); PORTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 363. This result is expected because "it
is generally to the advantage of everyone for an individual to work effectively"
where rewards are given group- or organization-wide, "[tihus, good perform-
ance is much more likely to be supported by other employees." PORTER ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 363.
108. For a discussion of measurable performance and its relation to motiva-
tion, see supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. Individual bonuses, how-
ever, are the method of compensation least likely to minimize negative outcomes
related to performance, such as ostracism by peers. This consideration is perti-
nent because whistleblowers are typically treated with suspicion and often suffer
severe forms of social retaliation. See MYRON P. GLAZER & PENINA M. GLAZER,
THE WHISTLEBLOWERS (1989) (providing anecdotal evidence on personal and
professional consequences of decisions to blow whistle); John C. Coffee Jr., Be-
yond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1146 (1977) (stating that "near una-
nimity exists among observers of the corporation that within its hierarchy no act
is viewed more disfavorably, indeed seen virtually as 'treason,' than disclosure of
adverse confidential information to outsiders"). Nonetheless, the rewards litera-
ture indicates that, overall, the motivational potential of financial rewards for
whistleblowing may be great.
109. For a discussion of the relationship between motivation and reward
size, timeliness and publication, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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that can affect the efficacy of whistleblowing rewards, such as em-
ployee participation and organizational trust, however, are neces-
sarily situation-specific. 1l0
IV. ANALYSIS OF REWARD LEGISLATION
The social-psychological literature thus strongly suggests
that a properly administered system of monetary rewards will ef-
fectively encourage whistleblowing. The next logical inquiry is
whether recently enacted legislation providing financial incentives
for whistleblowers is structured appropriately to take advantage
of this opportunity. The primary focus of this discussion is on the
False Claims Act,"'I the most prominent of the reward statutes.
A. The History and Structure of the False Claims Act
At the urging of President Lincoln, the False Claims Act was
passed in 1863 to help stem widespread procurement fraud
against the Union Army.' 2 With the incorporation of a provision
allowing for qui tam actions, private citizens were encouraged to
help prevent fraud by filing an action on behalf of the govern-
ment as well as themselves.' '3 The citizen-enforcer who filed suit
under the FCA (the relator) was allowed to keep a percentage of
the funds recovered as an incentive and reward for helping to en-
force the law." 14
110. For a discussion of these considerations in relation to motivation, see
supra notes 90 & 96 and accompanying text.
111. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988). For the text of pertinent sections of
the FCA, see notes 2 & 29-30.
112. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 6, 12 Stat. 696 (current version at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988)). Because President Lincoln had not been able to
limit procurement fraud by well-connected Army contractors, he included qui
tam provisions in the original act. France, supra note 33, at 47. The objective of
the act was to punish government contractors who were, among other things,
selling sawdust for gunpowder. Strasser, supra note 22, at 43.
113. The term "qui tam" is derived from the phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," or he "who brings the action for the king as
well as for himself." France, supra note 33, at 47; see also Evan Caminker, Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 (1989) (stating
that, in qui tam action, private citizen brings "civil proceeding on behalf of both
herself and the United States to recover damages and/or to enforce penalties
available under a statute prohibiting specified conduct"; plaintiff shares mone-
tary recovery with government).
114. The original act provided:
The person bringing said suit and prosecuting it to final judgment shall
be entitled to receive one-half the amount of such forfeiture, as well as
one-half the amount of the damages he shall recover and collect; and
the other half thereof shall belong to and be paid over to the United
States; and such person shall be entitled to receive to his own use all
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Over time, however, the vitality of the FCA was eroded.
Amendments to the legislation and judicial interpretations in the
twentieth century significantly inhibited the ability of
whistleblowers to successfully prosecute FCA claims. 1 5 By the
mid-1980s, six or fewer claims a year were being brought under
the FCA. 116 The defense procurement scandals and growing rec-
ognition of fraud in other federal contracting areas, however,
spurred amendment of the FCA in 1986.117 According to Senator
costs the court may award against the defendant, to be allowed and
taxed according to any provision of law or rule of court in force, or that
shall be in force in suits between private parties in said court: Provided,
That such person shall be liable for all costs incurred by himself in the
case, and shall have no claim therefor on the United States.
36 U.S.C. § 3493 (1874) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988)).
115. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1103-06
(7th Cir. 1984) (discussing abuse of FCA and legislative and judicial response);
France, supra note 33, at 47 (stating that 1943 amendment and adverse judicial
interpretations "crippled qui tam plaintiffs' ability to bring actions"); Caminker,
Comment, supra note 113, at 343 n.12 (noting that perceived abuse of reward
structure by informers who copied information from government documents led
to congressional imposition of jurisdictional restrictions in qui tam suits; these
jurisdictional restrictions, FCA's failure to guarantee minimum share in recovery
and judicial interpretations imposing high burdens of persuasion and proof on
qui tam plaintiffs "contributed to the action's virtual dormancy" in last 50 years).
116. See France, supra note 33, at 48.
117. The False Claims Reform Act was proposed by Senator Charles
Grassley after he conducted several investigations of defense-contracting
abuses. Id. at 46. After concluding that neither reform of the procurement pro-
cess nor reliance on the Justice Department's efforts would stem the rampant
fraud, Senator Grassley turned to the idea of qui tam actions. Id. at 47. Senators
Dennis DeConcini and Carl Levin co-sponsored the bill. SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS ACT Or 1985, S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5278; see also The False Claims Re-
form Act, S. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The Senate Report summarizes
the concerns which led to this legislation:
Evidence of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a
steady rise. In 1984, the Department of Defense conducted 2,311 fraud
investigations, up 30 percent from 1982 .... In 1985, the Department
of Defense Inspector General . . . testified that 45 of the 100 largest
defense contractors, including 9 of the top 10, were under investigation
for multiple fraud offenses. Additionally, the Justice Department has
reported that in the last year, four of the largest defense contractors...
have been convicted of criminal offenses while another . . . has been
indicted and awaits trial.
S. REP. No. 345, at 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267 (footnotes omit-
ted). The Senate Report also noted that "[flraud permeates generally all Gov-
ernment programs ranging from welfare and food stamps benefits, to
multibillion dollar defense procurements, to crop subsidies and disaster relief
programs." Id. at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267.
These concerns about government waste and fraud were paralleled on the
state level. State legislatures, in addition, also expressed concern about safety-
related incidents which might have been prevented if whistleblowing had oc-
curred. See, e.g., STATE ETHICS COMM'N, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATEMENT OF
THE STATE ETHICS COMMISSION ON RAISED COMMITTEE BILL No. 5542, at 1
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Grassley, this amendment would encourage "private attorneys
general" who would help enforce the laws and protect the treas-
ury by prosecuting wrongdoers that the government does not
have the adequate resources to pursue.' 1 8
Procedurally, when a relator files a qui tam action under the
revised act, the complaint and written disclosure of all material
evidence and information possessed by the relator is served on
the government and placed under seal.' 19 The government then
has sixty days to decide whether to intervene and take over the
prosecution of the claim.' 20 If the government chooses to prose-
cute the action, the relator receives an amount ranging from fif-
teen to twenty-five percent of any treble damages and fines
recovered from the defendant.' 2' Where the government decides
(1982) (supporting House Bill 5542 which would protect state employees "from
retaliation by superiors because the employee revealed instances of malfeasance
which affect State interests" and public welfare). As a result, both state courts
and legislatures moved toward whistleblowing as a means to control organiza-
tional wrongdoing. Courts began to erode the employment-at-will doctrine, al-
lowing employees to sue when they suffered retaliation for whistleblowing. See
Terry M. Dworkin & Elletta S. Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the In-
terests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 267, 285-88
(1991) (discussing approaches taken by courts towards internal whistleblowing).
It was also in this time period (the 1980s) that approximately three-quarters of
the states passed whistleblowing legislation. For a discussion of this legislation,
see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
118. False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2 (1990) [hereinafter FCA Implementation Hearing] (remarks of Sen.
Grassley) (asking committee to consider problem areas of "people's attitude to-
ward the law" and "the actual language of the law"); see also Robert L. Vogel,
Citizens' Lawsuits Based on the False Claims Act Have Multiplied, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26,
1990, at 20 (discussing private attorney general role envisioned by statute).
119. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988). According to this provision, "[tihe
complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days,
and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders." Id.
120. Id. "The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the
action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evi-
dence and information." Id. The government has joined in approximately 25%
of the first 200 qui tam claims filed since October, 1986. Vogel, supra note 118, at
21.
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). The award will depend "upon the extent to
which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action." Id.
The exact amount the relator receives is determined by the court. Id. If the
relator's suit is based on publicly disclosed information, however, the award can
be less than 10%. Id. Penalties for false claims can range up to $10,000 per
false claim, plus three times the amount of damages suffered by the government.
Id. § 3729(a).
TheJustice Department, if it takes over the prosecution, controls the litiga-
tion. Id. § 3730(c)(1). The relator remains a party to the action, but has little
role in decisionmaking. Id. He or she is entitled to notice and a hearing, how-
ever, if the Justice Department decides to dismiss or settle the case. Id.
§ 3730(c)(2).
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against intervention, the individual plaintiff may proceed with the
suit and, if successful, can recover up to thirty percent of the
judgment or settlement, plus costs and attorneys' fees.' 22
B. False Claim Revisions
As demonstrated by the rewards literature, the clarity of the
link between the conduct desired and the reward given can deter-
mine the efficacy of a financial incentive. The 1986 amendments
to the FCA, by ensuring that relators will receive payment for use-
ful information they provide, offer just such a clear link. These
amendments, thus, could prove to be the most important and ef-
fective changes made to this legislation. These amendments, and
their suggested impact, are discussed in the following sections.
1. Amendments Increasing the Likelihood of Recovery
The 1986 amendments to the FCA increase the likelihood of
recovery by a qui tam plaintiff in several ways: (a) by guaranteeing
minimum amounts to be awarded in successful cases; (b) by mak-
ing it easier for a plaintiff to make a successful claim; and (c) by
potentially expanding the class of persons who may bring claims.
a. Amendments Guaranteeing Minimum Recovery
Previously, there was no guaranteed minimum recovery for a
successful qui tam plaintiff. A relator could be awarded an insig-
nificant amount, or nothing at all, for providing information and
pursuing a claim.' 23 Because coming forward with the informa-
tion could cost the relator his or her job or career, or have other
significant consequences, this lack of a clear connection between
providing information and being rewarded likely contributed to
122. Id. §§ 3730(c)(3), (d)(2). If the government decides not to proceed in
the action, the amount received by the qui tam plaintiff will not be less than 25%
of the proceeds and, in addition, the plaintiff will "receive an amount for reason-
able expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus rea-
sonable attorneys' fees and costs," all of which is awarded against the defendant.
Id. § 3730(d)(2). The Justice Department, however, still can monitor the pro-
gress and prosecution of the suit, and must consent to any dismissal. Id.
§§ 3730(b)(1), (c)(3)-(5).
123. If the government did not pursue an action, the court could award the
successful relator a "reasonable" amount, not to exceed 25% of the judgment
or settlement. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (1982) (amended 1986). If the govern-
ment joined in the prosecution, the relator could receive up to 10% of the re-
covery for the value of the information the government did not have before the
action was brought, again depending upon what the court believed to be a rea-
sonable amount. Id. § 3730(c)(1) (amended 1986).
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the small number of claimants willing to take such risks. 124 The
1986 amendments guarantee that relators will receive "not less
than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of
the action or settlement" in cases that they pursue themselves;
the amendments also clarify that reasonable expenses of pursuing
the claim, including attorneys' fees, should be awarded against
the defendant. 2 5 In cases that the Justice Department decides to
join, the minimum recovery for the relator is fifteen percent of the
proceeds of the action. 126
The minimum recoveries guaranteed by the FCA amend-
ments distinguish the FCA from the other major reward provi-
sions recently authorized by Congress. The financial incentives
authorized by the other statutes are awarded at the discretion of
the administering federal agency. For example, under FIRREA,
an appropriate federal banking agency, with the concurrence of
the Attorney General, may pay a reward.' 27 The agency's deci-
sion concerning the award "is final and not reviewable by any
court."' 2 8 Similarly, any determination about the awarding of
bounties under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, "including
whether, to whom, or in what amount to make payments, is in the
sole discretion of the [Securities and Exchange] Commission."'129
Because there is no guarantee of any recovery, and indeed, no
track record of payments, neither of these reward provisions are
likely to spur much whistleblowing activity.
Nor have other federal agency reward decisions under earlier
authorizations been particularly generous to whistleblowers. For
example, the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary's delegate
is authorized to pay rewards for information leading to the detec-
tion and prosecution of violators of the Internal Revenue laws.'30
124. For a discussion of the link between performance and reward, see
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
125. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra
note 2.
126. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). The maximum award is 25% of the proceeds.
Id. Reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, are also available. Id. In
cases in which the government joins, and the information provided by the rela-
tor had been publicly disclosed, the relator can receive up to 10% of the amount
recovered, depending on the role of the relator in advancing the case and the
value of the information provided. Id.
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1831k(a), (d) (Supp. 11 1990). For a further discussion of
these provisions, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
128. Id. § 1831k(d).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 201.61 (1991) (setting forth procedures for bounty awards
under Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
130. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7623, 7701(a)(ll)(B) (1988) (authorizing Secretary of
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These discretionary rewards, however, have often been difficult
for informants to collect.' 3 ' Although a record number of award
requests were filed in the 1989-1990 claims year, it is estimated
that only nine percent will be granted. 32 One reason for this low
award percentage could be that typically, in discretionary re-
wards, the amount to be awarded by the agency comes out of the
agency's recovery.' 33 Thus, there is a strong incentive for the
agency to keep recoveries to a minimum. The facts that the court,
rather than an interested agency, makes the determination in an
FCA action, and that a minimum recovery amount is guaranteed,
make the FCA a much stronger spur to whistleblowing.
Further facilitating adequate rewards is the FCA amendment
that allows the relator a role in the litigation of cases taken over
by the government. The relator, even though the government
has taken over the case, now has the right to file motions, object
to settlements, and take part in arguments. 34 There were no in-
tervention rights in the statute prior to the 1986 amendments,
and a case could be dismissed, diverted or settled without input
from the whistleblower.13 5
Treasury to pay sums deemed necessary for detecting and bringing to trial per-
sons guilty of violating tax laws).
131. See, e.g., Silverstein v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 76-5038
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear informer suit for 10% of amount collected by IRS; IRC provision authoriz-
ing payment of reward to informant did not give rise to implied contract; regula-
tions authorizing director to award sums "as he deems suitable" do not
constitute offer of definite amount); Schein v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that district court was without jurisdiction to hear ac-
tion to recover reward for IRS tax recovery allegedly attributable to information
furnished by plaintiff).
132. Rewards for Information Tempt More Tattletales to Tell the IRS, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 1990, at Al (according to IRS, "few tips are good enough to merit
rewards").
133. See, e.g., Duke, supra note 27, at CI (discussing SEC endorsement of
paying tipsters to disclose insider trading).
134. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(l)-(2) (1988). According to these provisions, the
relator has the right to be notified of a motion for dismissal or settlement, and
has the right for a hearing on these matters. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B). If this op-
portunity has been provided, however, the government may then proceed with
the dismissal or settlement "notwithstanding the objections of the person initiat-
ing the action." Id. In addition, the participation of the relator can be limited if
the government shows that such participation would interfere with or unduly
delay the prosecution of the case, or that it would be repetitious, irrelevant, or
result in harassment. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
135. An example of this increased control is shown in the case of a General
Electric (G.E.) employee who blew the whistle on his employer's overcharges on
military contracts. See Gravitt v. General Elec. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.
Ohio 1988). Mr. Gravitt, a machinist supervisor for G.E., alleged that G.E. had
been substantially overcharging the government. Id. at 1162-63. He brought
30719921
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b. Amendments Facilitating Recovery
Several of the amendments to the FCA make it easier for a
relator to bring a successful claim. To the extent that this makes
recovery more certain, the connection between providing the in-
formation and collecting the reward is clearer.
For example, the relator in a FCA suit must prove that the
defendant "knowingly" submitted a false claim for payment.' 36
Prior to the 1986 amendments, courts were split as to whether
intent to defraud had to be shown. 137 The amendments cleared
up this ambiguity and eased the relator's burden by defining
"knowingly" to include deliberate ignorance and reckless disre-
gard as well as actual knowledge.' 3 8 A second procedural split of
authority was resolved by the amendments with the provision that
the relator must establish his or her proof by a preponderance of
the evidence, rather than the clear and convincing standard that
suit under the False Claims Act, and the government joined the suit. Id. at 1163;
see also Strasser, supra note 22, at 42. Gravitt's attorney successfully objected
when the government tried to settle the claim for $234,000, and persuaded the
judge to allow Gravitt to prosecute the claim. Strasser, supra note 22, at 42. On
the day set for trial, G.E. settled that suit and three others for $3.5 million. Id.
The whistleblowers, including Gravitt, reportedly received 22% of the recovery,
or $770,000. Id.
136. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988) (liability is incurred for knowingly
presenting a false claim, knowingly making or using a false record to get a false
claim paid, knowingly buying government property which may not lawfully be
sold by seller, knowingly making or using a false record to conceal or avoid gov-
ernment debt).
137. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972)
(recognizing split among circuit courts regarding requirement of specific intent
and whether, to prove violation of FCA, evidence must demonstrate guilty
knowledge of purpose on part of defendant to cheat government). Compare
United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 60 (8th Cir.
1973) (holding that negligent misrepresentation by claimant constitutes neces-
sary knowledge within meaning of FCA) and United States v. Fox Lake State
Bank, 225 F. Supp. 723, 725 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (holding that intent to defraud is
not required for "knowing" violation of FCA and knowing submission of false
claims is sufficient) with United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1970)
(requiring specific intent to defraud for liability under FCA) and United States v.
Priola, 272 F.2d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 1959) (requiring "guilty knowledge" for lia-
bility under FCA).
138. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). This section provides:
[T]he terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with re-
spect to information-
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the informa-
tion; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
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some courts had required previously.1 39
Another important change was the broadening of the defini-
tion of a "false claim." Although the Supreme Court, in the 1968
case of United States v Neifert-White Co., 140 called for a broad read-
ing of the definition of "claims" under the FCA-including all
fraudulent attempts to cause the government to pay out sums of
money-subsequent lower court decisions narrowed this inter-
pretation.' 4 ' In response to these decisions, Congress made clear
in the 1986 amendments that the FCA was to be read as broadly
as possible.1 42 A broad reading of the claim definition has elicited
information about a variety of activities including Medicare
fraud, 143 acquiring and redeeming stolen food stamps, 144 and
139. See id. § 3731(c) (stating that "United States shall be required to prove
all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence"). For a comparison of the standards previously used by
courts, see Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that preponderance of evidence is appropriate standard of proof under
FCA); United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that
government must establish violation of FCA by preponderance of evidence);
United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 447 F.2d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that there must be clear and convincing evidence of FCA violation).
140. 390 U.S. 228 (1968) (holding that FCA applied to supplying false in-
formation in support of federal agency loan application). In Neifert- White Co., the
Court stated that "the objective of Congress in enacting the False Claims Act
'was broadly to protect the funds and property of the Government from fraudu-
lent claims, regardless of the particular form, or function, of the government
instrumentality upon which such claims were made' ....... Id. at 233 (quoting
Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958)). Thus, according to the
Court, ."[t]his remedial statute reaches beyond 'claims' which might be legally
enforced, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of
money." Id.
141. See, e.g., Hansen v. National Comm'n on the Observance of Int'l Wo-
men's Year, 628 F.2d 533, 534 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that FCA is limited to
actions involving false demands for payment of money, transfer of property; ab-
sent allegation that commission fraudulently took money from government, no
cause of action under FCA).
142. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (1988). A false claim is defined as follows:
For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any request or demand,
whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is
made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States
Government provides any portion of the money or property which is
requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such con-
tractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or
property which is requested or demanded.
Id.
143. See, e.g., FCA Implementation Hearing, supra note 118, at 2 (discussing
$200 million Medicare fraud case from Florida where Department of Justice re-
ceived all information needed for case from qui tam plaintiff); France, supra note
33, at 48 (discussing fact that Medicare fraud "already has spawned a number of
qui tam lawsuits," including case partially settled in 1989 for $355,000).
144. See, e.g., Blusal Meats, Inc. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 824, 827
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paying kickbacks. 145
c. Amendments Clarifying Jurisdiction
Attempts to clarify and expand jurisdiction under the FCA
have so far proved to be the least successful amendments in terms
of forging a clear link between the desired behavior and the re-
ward. Jurisdictional challenges have been the biggest source of
FCA litigation to this point, and have allowed defendants-and
the government-to put a substantial barrier in the way of many a
potential relator's pursuit of recovery.' 4 6 Such obstacles provide
a general disincentive to blowing the whistle, and are particularly
discouraging to an especially important group of potential
whistleblowers-government workers.
The basic premise of the FCA is to promote whistleblowing
without concurrently rewarding useless information. 147 Accord-
ingly, the 1986 amendments prohibit recovery by a relator for in-
formation that was already in the hands of the government or
revealed in some public way before the claim was filed, unless the
claimant was the original source of the information. 4 8 The gov-
ernment has successfully challenged several post-amendment
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (alleging corporation violated FCA by knowingly accepting and
presenting stolen food stamps), aff'd, 817 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1987).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Killough, 625 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 (M.D. Ala.
1986) (alleging violation of FCA by participation in kickback scheme whereby
bids to provide disaster relief services to state were inflated to assure that de-
fendants would receive kickback). Coverage also encompasses false claims in-
volving the use of federal funds by state or local entities. See, e.g., United States
v. Board of Educ., 697 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.N.J. 1988) (alleging violation of
FCA by plan to pocket federal funds earmarked for purpose of improving city
schools). The amendment to § 3729(c) overruled United States ex rel. Salzman v.
Salant & Salant, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that once
federal funds given to grantees, FCA claim could not be made against them un-
less grantee is agent of government).
146. The authors of this Article have been collecting case reports since the
1986 amendment to the FCA. So far, the majority of the cases have been about
the right to sue.
147. For a discussion of the relationship between the reward and the value
of the information provided, see infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text.
148. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988). According to the provision,
courts do not have jurisdiction over an action that is brought on the basis of
publicly disclosed information unless brought by the Attorney General or unless
the relator bringing the suit was the "original source" of information brought to
light in "a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, adminis-
trative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investiga-
tion, or from the news media." Id. "Original source" is defined as someone
who has "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Gov-
ernment before filing an action .... " Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
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cases on the ground that the relator was not the original
source. 149 This result, of course, allows the government to keep
the entire award, but it also elicits a conflict between the policies
of encouraging the liberal disclosure of information, as envi-
sioned by Congress, and of supplementing the public treasury.
A related issue, and one that has engendered much litigation,
is whether government employees can bring qui tam actions under
the FCA. In terms of simple access, government employees are
among the individuals most likely to be aware of relevant infor-
mation regarding federal contractor fraud. In addition, part of
Congress' motivation for strengthening the FCA in 1986 was that
the government, for a variety of reasons, was underenforcing the
laws.' 50 Allowing lower-level employees to sue on behalf of the
government when their superiors have failed to take appropriate
action could substantially increase enforcement and recovery.' 51
Thus, challenges by the Justice Department to government em-
ployee suits put a damper on an important resource.
The courts have recognized the important potential role of
government whistleblowers, and thus have been reluctant to rule
that these employees can never bring qui tam actions. 52 There is
a split of opinion, however, as to whether and when to allow suit
149. See, e.g., United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20
(1st Cir. 1990) (holding that government employee could not bring qui tam ac-
tion under FCA because employee was not "original source"); United States ex
rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16-18 (2d Cir. 1990) (barring
suit under FCA where plaintiff was not "original source" of publicly disclosed
information); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am., 736 F. Supp. 614, 622-23 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding infor-
mation obtained by law firm in discovery during suit alleging Medicare fraud did
not qualify as "original source" under FCA); United States v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1031, 1035-36 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding nonprofit corpora-
tion which learned of alleged wrongful activities at nuclear weapons plant from
government employee was not proper party to bring action under FCA).
150. See Caminker, Comment, supra note 113, at 350-51, 361 (stating that
dependence by government agencies on individuals in military-industrial com-
plex may compromise desire to prosecute wrongdoers diligently; "central prem-
ise underlying qui tam authorization is that, when viewed from a more global
perspective, the set of targeted misconduct is underenforced in a regime of ex-
clusive executive discretion").
151. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency,
929 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding valid cause of action existed in FCA suit
brought by government attorney alleging superiors facilitated fraudulent con-
tract with agency to be regulated).
152. See, e.g., LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20 (holding FCA does not absolutely bar
qui tam actions by government employees); United States ex rel. McDowell v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that
under certain circumstances government employee's qui tam action may fall
within subject matter jurisdiction of federal district court); Erickson ex rel. United
States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 912-13 (E.D.
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by government employees on the basis of information gained
through theirjobs. The original version of the FCA did not allow
such actions. 53 The revisions, on the other hand, permit any
"person" to bring suit unless he or she falls into one of five
exceptions. 54
One of the jurisdictional exceptions prohibits suits based on
information made public in a governmental action unless the po-
tential relator was the original, voluntary source of the informa-
tion to the government. 55 Thus, a question raised after the 1986
amendments, in United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co. ,156 was
whether government workers who acquire actionable information
in the course of their employment were excluded as potential re-
lators by this exception. Because gaining such information was
done in the scope of the employee's job responsibilities, it was
argued (successfully in this case) that the information therefore
Va. 1989) (permitting government employees to sue as relators in qui tam action
on ground that FCA does not make "blanket exclusion").
153. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982), amended by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)
(1988). The 1982 version stated: "Unless the Government proceeds with the
action, the court shall dismiss an action brought by the person on discovering
the action is based on evidence or information the Government had when the
action was brought." Id. Thus, before the amendments, government employees
were effectively prohibited from bringing qui tam actions because § 3730(d) de-
nied jurisdiction to actions based on information already possessed by the gov-
ernment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McCans v. Armour & Co., 146 F. Supp.
546, 549-50 (D.D.C. 1956) (per curiam) (excluding "parasitical" claims under
FCA based on information acquired in government service), aff'd, 254 F.2d 90
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958).
154. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), (e) (1988). Under § 3730(e), certain ac-
tions are barred; no court has jurisdiction over the following: (1) action arising
out of service in the armed forces by a former or current member of the armed
forces against a member of the armed forces; (2) action "against a Member of
Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive branch official if the
action is based on evidence or information known to the Government when the
action was brought"; (3) action based on "allegations or transactions which are
the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in
which the Government is already a party"; (4) action based on publicly disclosed
information unless "the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information." Id. § 3730(e). In addition, when a relator has filed an action, "no
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action
based on the facts underlying the pending action." Id. § 3730(b)(5).
155. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
156. 729 F. Supp. 170, 175-77 (D. Mass.) (addressing issue of whether FCA
barred qui tam action by government employee; holding that information gained
by government employee as condition of employment belonged to government
and FCA suit was barred), aff'd, 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming deci-
sion that government employee in this case could not bring qui tam action, but
clarifying district court's analysis in that FCA does not absolutely bar qui tam
actions by government employees).
[Vol. 37: p. 273312
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belonged to the employer, the government.1 57 Allowing govern-
ment employees to bring suit in these circumstances was charac-
terized as permitting opportunism and personal benefit from
information acquired at taxpayer expense. 158 Further, because
the government already possessed the information, it was as-
serted that there could be no voluntary disclosure, as required by
the statute. 159 The appellate courts, however, have uniformly re-
jected this interpretation, reasoning that Congress, by spelling
out the classes of people ineligible to bring qui tam actions-and
not including government employees on this list-must have in-
tended to permit such suits.' 60 Although such suits have been
allowed, it is still very difficult for government employees to
prove they are the original source of the information, or that they
157. Id. at 175-77.
158. Id. at 176. The court stated:
A lawsuit by a former government employee based on information he
obtained solely through his employment can fairly be construed as "op-
portunistic." The relator in such a context would profit from informa-
tion already obtained at the taxpayers' expense ... , permitting former
government employees to bring qui tam actions based upon information
they discovered on the job would allow them to be paid twice for the
same work. That is not what Congress had in mind.
Id.
159. Id. at 177 n.18; see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988) (defining "origi-
nal source" as "individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the
information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action under this section which
is based on the information"). In a novel jurisdictional exclusion argument, the
government in United States ex reL Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency,
929 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1991), asserted that Hagood, a government attor-
ney who was preparing a contract, was engaged in an "administrative investiga-
tion." Thus, according to the government, the statutory exclusion of
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) was met. Id. The government then further alleged that the
"public disclosure" requirement of this section was met when the attorney, as a
government employee, disclosed the information on which the suit was based to
himself, a member of the public. Id. The court, however, dismissed this argu-
ment as "tortured," stating that Hagood had based his suit on "information that
he acquired in preparing the contract"-non-publicly disclosed information. Id.
160. See, e.g., Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1419-20 (rejecting absolute jurisdictional
bar to qui tam actions by government employees); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v.
Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that government em-
ployees are not barred from bringing qui tam actions); United States v. CAC-
Ramsey, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that qui tam suit
by former government employee not barred after government failed to take ac-
tion); Erickson ex rel. United States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716
F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding neither FCA structure, history or purpose
excludes government employees from bringing qui tam actions). For an example
where Congress did spell out those prohibited from bringing suit, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831k(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1990) (under FIRREA, government employees and of-
ficers specifically prohibited from collecting reward).
19921 313
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are presenting the information in a new way.16'
2. Amendments Increasing the Amount of Recovery
Another hurdle to increased whistleblowing was also over-
come with the 1986 amendments-making the award large
enough for employees to want to take the risks involved with dis-
closure. In order for a reward to be effective, it must be perceived
as sufficiently substantial to justify the required effort. 162
Whistleblowers can incur substantial personal and professional
penalties for providing information of organizational wrongdo-
ing. They may suffer job-related consequences including dis-
charge, failure to achieve promotion, blackballing, and social
ostracism, as well as health and family problems caused by stress
from these various forms of retaliation. 163 In addition, in order to
collect the reward, they must suffer the hassles and emotional
trauma of a lawsuit. The substantial nature of these potential
penalties requires a commensurate reward in order to encourage
the desired behavior. The increased amounts recoverable under
the amendments, when combined with the increased certainty of
recovery, are likely to be perceived as sufficient to justify taking
the risk. 164
Measured by these standards, the rewards for whistleblowing
such as those offered by the states of Oregon and South Carolina
161. See, e.g., LeBlanc, 913 F.2d 17 (stating that even though FCA does not
bar qui tam actions by government employees, employee whose responsibilities
included uncovering fraud was barred from bringing suit on grounds that he had
no independent knowledge or information).
162. For a discussion of the relationship between reward size and motiva-
tion, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
163. See Dworkin & Near, supra note 13, at 262 (noting that back pay and
reinstatement do not compensate for emotional and physical upheaval of being
unemployed); Goldberg, supra note 22, at 75 (stating that consequences of
whistleblowing go beyond workplace and include financial upheaval, divorce and
deterioration of physical and mental health); Nancy R. Hauserman, Whistle-Blow-
ing. Individual Morality in a Corporate Society, 29 Bus. HORIZONS 4, 9 (1986) (noting
that whistleblowers are not considered part of corporate "team" and have little
luck in finding new employment).
164. Before the 1986 amendments, the FCA provided for double damages
and fines of $2,000 per false claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982) (amended
1986). The statute had provided:
A person not a member of an armed force of the United States is liable
to the United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an
amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sus-
tains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action.
Id. Damages are now trebled, and fines range from $5,000 to $10,000 per false
claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). For a discussion of the range of award
amounts, see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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are woefully inadequate, and are unlikely to have any impact on
reporting activity. 165 While awards authorized by federal legisla-
tion other than the FCA are potentially large enough to have
some impact if the upper recovery levels are reached, none of
these other legislatively-created awards can reach the level of an
FCA award.' 66 Thus, to the extent that the size of the recovery is
determinative of the motivational effect of financial incentives for
whistleblowing, the FCA is likely to be the most effective of these
laws because it involves the greatest potential rewards.
3. Timeliness
Perhaps the biggest drawback of the structure of the FCA in
spurring whistleblowing is that it can take many years between the
reporting of the information through filing a claim and the receipt
of the reward. Since timeliness has an important impact on the
motivational potency of rewards, this wait can have a negative in-
fluence on whistleblowing. 167 Delays in recovery were especially
prevalent in the early cases, where issues such as constitutionality
and jurisdiction had to be decided before the claim could be pur-
sued. 168 As these issues are settled, some delay, at least, should
be minimized. 169
Another source of delay, however, is built into the structure
of the FCA. The relator must wait at least sixty days while the
government studies the claim before the defendant in the action
is even served.' 70 This period can be extended with court con-
sent for "good cause," and the Justice Department usually re-
quests one or more extensions.' 7' This delay, when combined
165. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra notes 18-19 and accompa-
nying text.
166. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra notes 23-27, 127-33 and
accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of the relationship between the timeliness of a reward
and motivation, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of one such constitutional claim raised in connection
with FCA litigation, see infra note 206 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the jurisdictional issues raised in connection with FCA litigation, see supra
notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
169. All suits challenging the constitutionality of the FCA have been lost.
Thus, this issue is unlikely to again be seriously litigated.
170. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988) (stating that "complaint shall ...
remain under seal for at least 60 days").
171. See id. § 3730(b)(3) (stating that "Government may, for good cause
shown, move the court for extensions of the time during which the complaint
remains under seal"); Vogel, supra note 118, at 20 (noting that "[i]n some com-
plex cases, courts have granted the Justice Department a series of extensions
covering several years"). This period is designed to give the government a
1992] 315
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with what is usually complicated discovery and extremely
crowded court dockets, can mean that it will take a year or more
before a reward is recovered in a successful claim. Appeals, of
course, can slow payment further.
The time factor could have the positive result of driving a
settlement, but in settling, relators almost always receive less than
the anticipated reward in exchange for a prompt payment.1 72
This, in turn, increases the importance of the size of the potential
recovery. If the potential recovery is large enough, a settlement
for prompt payment of an amount sufficient to justify the risks of
disclosure can be negotiated. It is also possible, however, that
people could be more likely to wait a few years, even without ajob
or meaningful career, if there is a high likelihood that they will be
paid several hundred thousands, or millions, of dollars at the end
of that period. Thus, considering either alternative-settlement
or waiting out litigation-reward structures that involve the possi-
bility of litigation and its resultant delays must allow for large po-
tential recoveries in order to be effective.' 73 The False Claims
Act does this.
4. Information
A final factor relevant to the motivational effectiveness of re-
wards is adequate information. Information regarding the availa-
bility, calculation and allocation of rewards, as well as the
likelihood of success, is important. 74 While most federal awards
chance to evaluate whether joining the suit and taking over the prosecution
would be in its best interest, as well as to prevent premature disclosure of an
ongoing criminal investigation. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 117, at 24, reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5289.
172. Settlement pressures on the government can also put the government
at odds with the relator/co-plaintiff. See, e.g., Rick Wartzman & Paul M. Barrett,
For Whistle-Blowers, Tune May Change, WALL ST.J., Sept. 27, 1989, at BI (discuss-
ing defense industry's hope that Justice Department will thwart whistleblower
cases).
173. A possible alternative to litigation is the establishment of an adminis-
trative procedure to handle the claims. While this procedure has the potential of
being faster than litigation, the track record of federal administrative handling of
whistleblower complaints has been notoriously bad. The information has typi-
cally been ignored and the whistleblower punished. See Thomas M. Devine &
Donald G. Aplin, Abuse of Authority: The Office of The Special Counsel and
Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 5 (1986) (discussing whistleblower rights
being vulnerable to administrative abuse by Office of Special Counsel); Rhonda
McMillion, Aiding Whistle-Blowers, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1989, at 121 (stating that Office
of Special Counsel, by frequently working with agencies to harm employees, is
losing sight of objective).
174. For a discussion of the relationship between information and motiva-
tion, see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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provisions, such as those in FIRREA and the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act, have not been well publicized, the False Claims Act
has received a great deal of attention. Information concerning
the FCA has been broadly disseminated, in a variety of ways, in
the past few years.
The False Claims Act has been widely discussed in business,
professional and trade journals, as well as in more generally read
magazines.' 75 These articles outline the basic requirements of
the FCA and stress the potential for (or danger of) huge recov-
eries. Thus, basic information is being delivered to important
groups of potential whistleblowers. Successful cases against gov-
ernment contractors have also been followed and widely re-
ported. The Wall StreetJournal, for example, often reports when
such a case is filed, when major pre-trial developments take place,
and when a case has been settled or gone to trial.1 76 Finally, the
development of a qui tam bar 177 and whistleblower advocacy
groups 78 have been important in the dissemination of adequate
information.
5. Post-Amendment Developments
While we cannot make an unequivocal, prediction as to
175. See, e.g., David F. Bond, Military Authorization Compromise Keeps Business
Integrity Rules' Schedule Intact, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 12, 1990, at 74
(discussing impact of FCA on defense contractors); Michael Brody, Listen To Your
Whistleblower, FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 1986, at 77 (warning managers to find problems
and encourage employees to blow whistle); Rosemary Chalk, Making the World
Safe for Whistleblowers, TECH. REV., Jan. 1988, at 48 (advocating support for scien-
tists and engineers who blow whistle); Amy Dunkin, Blowing the Whistle Without
Paying the Piper, Bus. WK., June 3, 1991, at 138 (advising whistleblowers on how
to protect themselves); France, supra note 33, at 46 (discussing FCA procedures
and awards); Ted Gest, Why Whistle-Blowing Is Getting Louder, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Nov. 20, 1989, at 64 (discussing recent increase in FCA claims and large
monetary awards to whistleblowers); Goldberg, supra note 22 (discussing dilem-
mas faced by and public support offered to whistleblowers); Joseph Palca,Justice
Department Joins Whistleblower Suit, 249 SCIENCE 734 (1990) (marking first time for
government intervention in qui tam suit involving scientific misconduct).
176. See, e.g., Eileen White Read, Stealth Eludes Radar, But Not the Scrutiny of
Litigious Mr. Hafif" He & Clients Stand to Share Millions if They Show Northrop Bilked
the U.S., WALL ST.J., May 12, 1988, at A11; Amy Stevens & Milo Geyelin, Defend-
ants in Fraud Cases are Dealt Blow, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1991, at B6; Rick
Wartzman, Northrop Agrees to Pay About $9 Million to Settle Suit by Two Whistleblowers,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 1991, at A3; Rick Wartzman, Northrop, US May be Close to
Settlement, WALL ST.J., Mar. 18, 1991, at A3; Rick Wartzman, US May Join Suit by
Northrop Whistleblower, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1989, at A4.
177. For a discussion of this plaintiffs' bar, see supra note 35 and accompa-
nying text.
178. These groups include the Government Accountability Project and the
Center for Law in the Public Interest. For a discussion of the public interest
groups, see Goldberg, supra note 22, at 108.
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whether monetary rewards offered under the revised FCA will ef-
fectively encourage more whistleblowing, the research to date
clearly suggests that financial incentives, when properly struc-
tured, are likely to encourage acts of whistleblowing by individu-
als who might not otherwise make such disclosures. In factual (as
opposed to theoretical) terms, congressional faith in financial re-
wards to spur whistleblowing-at least under the FCA structure-
appears to be justified. Before the FCA was revised, relator suits
under the statute averaged six per year. 179 By late 1989, the
number of suits filed since the revisions became effective was
198.180 That figure had grown to 280 by the end of 1990.181
V. A NATION OF SNITCHES?
These early indications that financial incentives can be an ef-
fective method of encouraging the disclosure of wrongful conduct
do not, however, overcome concerns about whether the govern-
ment's use of such rewards is appropriate. The concerns regarding
appropriateness center on whether whistleblowing out of greed
rather than conscience should be encouraged and/or rewarded;
whether large rewards will engender false claims; whether en-
couraging "snitching" is somehow anti-American or anti-demo-
cratic; and whether the detrimental effect on organizational
efficiency and values will more than offset the benefits of in-
creased whistleblowing.
A. The Question of Motive
The debate over the motives for and the legitimacy of
whistleblowing has existed since the early 1970s when Ralph Na-
der first suggested that whistleblowing be employed as a way to
help control corporate and governmental wrongdoing. 82 That
179. See France, supra note 33, at 48.
180. See Wartzman & Barrett, supra note 172, at BI (discussing wave of
fraud cases filed under FCA by whistleblowers in defense industry).
181. See Michael Waldman, Time to Blow the Whistle?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25,
1991, at 13. This "exponential rise" is expected to continue. Id. Similarly, in
the first few months after rewards were authorized for tips under the Insider
Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988), 25
qualified tips had been filed. See Duke, supra note 27, at Cl, C12.
182. See Ralph Nader, A Code for Professional Integrity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1971, at 43. In this 1971 article, Nader called for whistleblowing by professional
employees and for the establishment of a Clearing House for Professional Re-
sponsibility. Id. Nader later broadened the class of whistleblowers to include all
employees. RALPH NADER ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING 1 (1972). For varying points
of view on the motive and legitimacy of whistleblowing, see Phillip I. Blumberg,
Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary
[Vol. 37: p. 273318
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this debate is still active is demonstrated by the split in opinion
between state legislatures and Congress over governmental re-
wards for whistleblowing.1 83 The approach taken by those states
hostile to rewarding whistleblowing reflects the view, expressed
in early whistleblowing articles by a few social scientists and
ethicists, that disclosures motivated by gain, as opposed to those
motivated by desire to correct the wrongdoing, are not "true"
whistleblowing, and thus are not to be encouraged. 8 4
Over time, however, legal writers have concluded that motive
is secondary to the public good. Under this view, to the extent
that whistleblowing provides information beneficial to societal in-
terests, it is irrelevant whether the information was provided out
of greed or conscience.' 85 Social scientists, approaching the de-
bate from a different perspective, have generally arrived at the
same conclusion. From both perspectives, so long as the
whistleblowing will halt or prevent organizational wrongdoing, it
should be legitimized.' 8 6 In the current literature of both disci-
plines, motive is only important as a reflection of the
Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279 (1971) (discussing corporate social responsibility
and disclosure in public interest); James M. Roche, The Competitive System: To
Work, to Preserve, and to Protect, 1971 VITAL SPEECHES 445, 447 (viewing many
consumer laws as unnecessary and as harassment to business); Kenneth D. Wal-
ters, Thinking Ahead: Your Employees' Right to Blow the Whistle, HARV. Bus. REV.,
July-Aug. 1975, at 26 (suggesting that employees express views without compro-
mising employer integrity).
183. While Congress clearly endorses rewards, some states have gone so
far as to refuse to protect whistleblowers who profit from their disclosures. For
a discussion of this split in opinion, see supra notes 18-27 and accompanying
text.
184. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 117, at 299-304 (discussing posi-
tion advanced by several social scientists on whistleblowing motivation); J.
Vernon Jensen, Ethical Tension Points in Whistleblowing, 6 J. Bus. ETHICS 321
(1987) (hypothesizing that conscientious decision to blow whistle can be com-
plex ethical struggle).
185. See, e.g., Terry Ann Halbert, The Cost of Scruples: A Call for Common Law
Protection for the Professional Whistleblower, 10 NOVA L.J. 1 (1985) (discussing legal
protection for whistleblowers, public policy and private power); Margaret Malin,
Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 MICH. J.L. REFORM 277,
277-78 (1983) (discussing utility of whistleblowing to society); Nicholas M.
Rogine, Toward a Coherent Legal Response to the Public Policy Dilemma Posed by
Whistleblowing, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 281, 282-87 (1985) (justifying employees' right
to blow whistle under duty of loyalty to society).
186. See Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: The Case
of Whistle-Blowing, 4 J. Bus. ETHICS 1, 1-3 (1985) (using motivational theories to
discuss variables which affect decision to blow whistle); Near et al., supra note 10
(stating that whistleblowing is "influence process in which the whistle-blower
attempts to exert power over the organization or some of its members, in order
to persuade the dominant coalition to terminate the wrongdoing"). The False
Claims Act pursues whistleblowing from a somewhat different perspective, for it
encourages after-the-fact reporting to the government to enable the government
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whistleblower's good faith belief in the legitimacy of the informa-
lion about the wrongdoing. 18 7 If the whistleblower is not
fabricating the information, or reckless in regard to the accuracy
of the information, then motive becomes secondary; the informa-
tion provided is the focal point.
Congress' approach in the FCA reflects this view: if the rela-
tor brings forth new information that results in a successful claim,
that information is valued and thus viewed as worth paying for.
Motive becomes important only if the information proves merit-
less. For example, the judge can assess costs against a relator
who acted out of a desire to harass or be vexatious. 188
In arriving at these current standards for motive and "new-
ness" of information, Congress had over forty years of FCA inter-
pretation on which to draw. In those years, both standards have
shifted back and forth because ofjudicial interpretation and legis-
lative amendment. For example, in 1943, in United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 189 the Supreme Court adopted an expansive ap-
proach toward information, finding that private claimants could
bring claims under the FCA although they were relying on public
information provided by someone else.190 The dissenting Justice,
JusticeJackson, had a slightly different point of view.19' While he
felt that motive was irrelevant, he did not believe that a relator
should be rewarded for information already in the possession of
the government. 192
to reclaim funds falsely obtained by the wrongdoer. In both instances, however,
correction of the wrongdoing is the goal.
187. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 185, at 20-24 (discussing case of ethical
employee who feels compelled to blow whistle); Near & Miceli, supra note 186, at
3 (stating that, "[i]f organization members report 'wrongdoing' which they be-
lieve to be illegitimate acts outside the organization's purview to authority, then
this is truly whistleblowing"); Rogine, supra note 185, at 284 (stating that ques-
tion of motive is distinct from question of truth of charge).
188. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1988) (providing that, if government does
not proceed with action and qui tam plaintiff conducts action, court may award
defendant reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if defendant prevails and court
finds that claim of plaintiff was "clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought
primarily for purposes of harassment").
189. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
190. Id. at 545-46. According to the Court: "Even if... the petitioner has
contributed nothing to the discovery of this crime, he has contributed much to
accomplishing one of the purposes for which the Act was passed." Id. at 545. As
the Court recognized, "[t]here is of course no reason why Congress could not, if
it had chosen to do so, have provided specifically for the amount of new infor-
mation which the informer must produce to be entitled to reward." Id. at 546
n.9.
191. See id. at 556 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 558 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson stated:
[Vol. 37: p. 273
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Congress agreed, at least in part, with Justice Jackson. 9 3 In
Congress' view, "mere busybodies" (in the words of Justice Jack-
son) who did not contribute new information, but were only lin-
ing their pockets, should not be permitted to obtain windfalls.' 94
Congress therefore promptly revised the FCA in 1943 to overrule
Marcus, and refocused the statute to reward the relator for the
usefulness of the information.195 The 1943 amendment required
a court to dismiss an FCA action brought by an individual on the
basis of evidence in possession of the government when the ac-
tion was brought. 96 Many courts read the 1943 amendment lit-
erally and narrowly and, on the basis of the amendment, excluded
claims by potential relators who otherwise supplied useful infor-
mation. In one line of cases, for example, whistleblowers who
first supplied information to the government and cooperated in
government investigations, and who later sought to recover
under the FCA, were barred because the government had the in-
formation when their suit was filed.' 97
Informers who disclose law violations even for the worst of motives
play an important part in making laws effective. But there is nothing in
the text or history of this statute which indicates to me that Congress
intended to enrich a mere busybody who copies a Government's indict-
ment as his own complaint and who brings to light no frauds not al-
ready disclosed and no injury to the Treasury not already in process of
vindication.
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
193. See H.R. REP. No. 660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986) (recognizing
that, because of Marcus ruling, FCA qui tam provisions "were amended in 1943 to
preclude qui tam suits that are based on information in the Government's posses-
sion, even though the Government may have had the information for a long time
but had taken no action on this information").
194. In Representative Walter's opinion, "the latest count [of FCA cases as
of December 17, 1943] showed 250 cases, in none of which had any service been
rendered to the United States." 89 CONG. REC. 10,846 (1943) (statement of
Rep. Walter). Thus, according to Representative Kefauver, the 1943 amend-
ments were designed to protect the government, and protect corporations
"from being defrauded and harassed by shysters or people who might bring suit
without any information or with little information." Id. at 10,849 (statement of
Rep. Kefauver). Members of Congress did distinguish, however, between the
"dishonest and unscrupulous" who took advantage of information already
known to the government and those who came forward with new information
and should therefore have been rewarded. Id. at 10,846 (statement of Rep. Wal-
ter on why Congress had not abolished qui tam actions nor followed the larcus
approach of allowing everyone to sue).
195. See H.R. REP. No. 660, supra note 193, at 22.
196. 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976), recodified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1982),
amended by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (1988). The old section provided: "Unless the
Government proceeds with the action, the court shall dismiss an action brought
by the person on discovering the action is based on evidence or information the
Government had when the action was brought." Id.
197. See, e.g., Safir v. Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742, 747 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding
1992]
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Drawing on this history, Congress, in the 1986 amendments,
rejected the extreme positions on freshness of the information of
both Marcus and the restrictive post-1943 amendment interpreta-
tions. With the objective of promoting whistleblowing without
rewarding useless information, Congress came down on the side
of encouraging the disclosure of information, even if that infor-
mation has limited value. 198 Under the 1986 amendments, a find-
ing by the court that a successful action was based primarily on
disclosures through government sources, rather than information
provided by the relator, does not prevent the relator from bene-
fitting under the FCA; the reward in such instances, however, may
not exceed ten percent of the amount recovered. 199 In addition,
a suit can be filed on the basis of previously reported information
if the relator was the "original source" of information brought to
light in "a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congres-
sional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media" before
the relator's suit was brought.20 0 The FCA, however, still focuses
somewhat on the value of the information provided; this focus is
evidenced by the FCA reward scheme which allows the relator dif-
ferent recovery amounts, depending on the novelty and useful-
ness of the information.20
This emphasis on information over motive is reflected in the
FCA in other, more subtle ways. For example, if the relator's ac-
tion would interfere with a government investigation arising out
that plaintiff was not entitled to bring qui tam action under FCA on basis of infor-
mation already furnished to government); United States v. Aster, 275 F.2d 281,
283 (3d Cir.) (holding that court did not have jurisdiction over qui tam suit where
essential information held by plaintiff was already in government possession),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960).
198. See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 117, at 27-29, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5292-94. The Senate Committee "recognize[d] that guarantee-
ing compensation for individuals . . . could result in inappropriate windfalls
where the relator's involvement with the evidence is indirect at best." Id. at 28,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5293. The Committee believed, however, that
some financial award was still justified, depending on "the significance of the
information and the role of the person in advancing the case to litigation," if the
government might not have recovered but for the relator's suit. Id.
199. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (1988). The full 10% recovery is allowed
in actions which the government has successfully prosecuted. See id. Of course,
10% of a multimillion dollar case can be substantial.
200. See id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The relator must have voluntarily provided the
information to the government before the information was disclosed in a public
proceeding or the news media. See id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
201. See id. § 3730(d)(1). If the relator was the primary source of the infor-
mation, he or she can get between 15-25% of the award. See id. For the text of
the relevant provision of the FCA, see supra note 2.
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of the same facts, the court can order a stay in the relator's case,
thus insuring non-interference with the government's gaining of
information.20 2 Similarly, if a relator has filed suit, other parties
cannot intervene or bring related actions based on the underlying
facts of the relator's case.20 3 In such instances, there is no reason
to allow others to profit from the information which has already
been provided by the first relator.
The most explicit treatment of motive in the FCA is a section
which prevents a person from profiting from his or her own
wrongdoing. 20 4 Even in these cases, however, the limitation is
tempered by the desire for information. A party who planned and
initiated a false claim can still recover in a qui tam suit as long as
he or she is not convicted of criminal conduct arising from his or
her role in the false claim. 20 5
The courts have also implicitly rejected the argument that
large gains somehow illegitimize whistleblowing. 20 6 This rejec-
202. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(4) (providing that even if government decides
not to proceed with action, government may ask court to stay discovery by qui
tam plaintiff for up to 60 days upon showing that "certain actions of discovery by
the person initiating the action would interfere with the Government's investiga-
tion or prosecution of a criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts").
The section thus gives preference to governmental priorities over individual
claims.
203. See id. § 3730(b)(5) (stating that "no person other than the Govern-
ment may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the
pending action").
204. See id. § 3730(d)(3). The section provides:
Whether or not the Government proceeds with the action, if the
court finds that the action was brought by a person who planned and
initiated the violation of section 3729 upon which the action was
brought, then the court may, to the extent the court considers appro-
priate, reduce the share of the proceeds of the action which the person
would otherwise receive under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection,
taking into account the role of that person in advancing the case to
litigation and any relevant circumstances pertaining to the violation. If
the person bringing the action is convicted of criminal conduct arising
from his or her role in the violation of section 3729, that person shall
be dismissed from the civil action and shall not receive any share of the
proceeds of the action. Such dismissal shall not prejudice the right of
the United States to continue the action, represented by the Depart-
ment of Justice.
Id.
205. See id. A nonconvicted wrongdoer could still receive an award, de-
pending on his or her conduct and the "relevant circumstances." Id. In con-
trast, under FIRREA, Congress chose not to allow wrongdoers to claim awards
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. A person who "deliberately causes or
participates in the alleged violation of law or regulation" is ineligible to get a
reward regardless of the information provided. 12 U.S.C. § 1831k(c) (Supp. II
1990).
206. This does not mean, however, that the courts are unaware that some-
19921 323
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tion makes intuitive sense. If the disclosure of information pro-
tective of the public good is indeed spurred by large rewards, this
appeal to self-interest as opposed to altruism does not seem so
inherently wrong that the government should shun its use. In ad-
dition, it is too simplistic to attribute whistleblowing under the
False Claims Act simply to greed. It is equally likely that rational
decision-making based on a cost-benefit analysis is being under-
taken by the new whistleblowers. Proponents of the False Claims
Act make this argument and there is some evidence that Congress
agrees, seeing large rewards as a way to offset the significant per-
sonal and financial risks that whistleblowers may face.20 7 If this is
times the awards may be excessive in regard to the fraud committed and that the
punishment may exceed the crime. In United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), the FCA penalties were found to be so much greater than the
actual loss to the government that they amounted to double jeopardy. Id. at
854. In Halper, the defendant was charged with 65 counts of Medicare fraud. Id.
at 853. The loss to the government on these claims was $585, but the amount of
the penalties was $130,000. Id. at 855. Halper had already been sentenced to
two years in prison and fined $5,000 for the same acts. According to the court, if
the additional $130,000 penalties had been found to be remedial rather than
punitive, they would not have violated the constitutional proscription against
multiple punishments for the same crime. The court, however, found the addi-
tional penalties to be punitive, and thus violative of the double jeopardy clause.
Id. According to the court, these penalties constituted "punishment" because a
civil penalty designed to make the government whole cannot be totally unrelated
to the actual damages suffered. Id. The $130,000 penalty assessed was 220
times greater than the actual loss. Id. The court instead assessed a penalty of
$1,170 (twice the loss) and costs. Id.
207. See Strasser, supra note 22, at 42. Some proponents, such as John Phil-
lips, who helped to develop the qui tam amendments, believe that the reforms
were designed to put the risks of whistleblowing on the plane of an investment
decision. Id. As Phillips noted: "Now we are getting people who look coldly at
'What's in it for me?' There is no value to a weak case, after all. You are getting
more credible, solid people who feel good about doing the right thing." Id.;
(quoting John Phillips); see also False Claims Reform Act: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 86-88 (1985) (statement of John R. Phillips, Co-Director,
Center for Law in the Public Interest) (supporting FCA amendments which
would provide financial incentives for private action); S. REP. No. 345, supra note
117, at 27-28, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5292-93 (acknowledging risks
and sacrifices of private relators).
One of the main arguments used to challenge the constitutionality of the
FCA amendments was that self-interested private citizens, motivated at least in
part by personal gain, did not have standing to represent the interests of the
people. See Caminker, Comment, supra note 113. This argument has been uni-
formly rejected. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 614-15 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that qui tam plain-
tiffs have standing under case and controversy requirement of Constitution);
United States ex iel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084,
1096-99 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that congressional grant of standing under
FCA does not abrogate case or controversy limitation). Instead, qui tam relators
are considered "representatives of the public for the purpose of enforcing a pol-
icy explicitly formulated by legislation" and thus worthy of rewards for fulfilling
[Vol. 37: p. 273
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the case, rational decision-making which furthers the public inter-
est is certainly a goal worthy of support.
B. Fears of Groundless Claims
Voices raised against the FCA consistently cite the danger of
meritless claims motivated by greed. 208 Some assert that this has
already happened, citing the statistic that the Justice Department
has chosen to take over only forty-two of the nearly three hun-
dred claims brought since the 1986 amendments were enacted. 20 9
There is not, however, necessarily a correlation between the Jus-
tice Department opting to take over a claim and the merits of that
claim. On the one hand, the Department may believe that federal
interests will be adequately represented by the relator, or that the
amount to be recovered is not worth the expenditure of the De-
partment's limited resources, and thus will choose not to inter-
cede. 210 Alternatively, the decision not to intervene may be due
to the other types of cases the Justice Department is pursuing or
wishes to pursue and the implications of a successful prosecution
in those cases. 211 Thus, the significance of the Justice Depart-
ment's decision whether to join a suit could be compared to a
decision by the Supreme Court whether to grant certiorari.
Neither the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari nor the Justice
Department's decision not to become involved in an FCA claim
may properly be interpreted as a decision on the merits of the
controversy.
this role. Priche & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Indeed, in the legislative history of the FCA, the awards are re-
ferred to as "finders fees" which relators should receive as of right. S. REP. No.
345, supra note 117, at 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266.
208. See, e.g., Elkan Abramowitz, Mutiny for the Bounty-Qui Tam: Bonanza or
Fair Reward, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1990, at 3 (stating that minimum 15% recovery for
qui tam plaintiffs has resulted in increase of cases, but is mixed blessing due to
some clearly frivolous claims); Gest, supra note 175, at 64 (stating that workers
see chance for huge financial gain by blowing whistle on employer); Waldman,
supra note 181, at 14 (stating that FCA, because of sizeable monetary recoveries,
encourages defense contractor employees to sue).
209. See Abramowitz, supra note 208, at 3; Waldman, supra note 181, at 14.
210. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102
n.2 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing situation where United States declined to inter-
vene in qui tam action because government interests were served by relator's
control of case).
211. FCA Implementation Hearing, supra note 118, at 11 (testimony of Stuart
M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice). According to
Mr. Gerson: "[D]eclination of intervention [by the Justice Department] is not
the seal of approval of the conduct. It may be no more than an indication that
we find the standards for a fraud case have not been met, even though there may
be some other form of activity that can be otherwise pursued." Id.
1992]
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Moreover, there are many reasons why this fear of ground-
less claims is not soundly based. Prosecuting a successful qui tam
action without government intervention is generally very time-
consuming and expensive. 2 12 The cases often involve highly
technical issues and thousands of documents. Investigative costs
are burdensome. Moreover, the relator may well be facing de-
fendants with top legal counsel and considerable resources.
These are not odds that rational people-or their attorneys-
would accept without a good chance of success. Further, settle-
ment leverage to be gained from a meritless claim is minimal. 2 13
In addition to these practical impediments, the FCA provides
strong disincentives to bringing meritless claims. If a relator is
unsuccessful in his or her qui tam claim, the court can order the
relator to pay the defendant's costs and attorneys' fees if it finds
that the relator's claim "was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or
brought primarily for purposes of harassment." 214 The possibil-
ity of incurring the defendant's costs and fees, combined with the
deterrents discussed above, make genuinely groundless claims
highly unlikely.
The likelihood of a second type of specious claim-one based
on information previously revealed to the government-has for
the most part been eliminated. 215 Because of the structure of the
FCA and the willingness of the government to challenge any
claim believed not to be based on original information, such
"false whistleblowers" generally will not be successful today.
C. Citizen Intelligence Gathering or Spying?
Despite the states' apparent mistrust of reward statutes, there
is a long tradition in this country of rewarding people for infor-
mation that the government can use for prosecution. 21 6 One
212. See Vogel, supra note 118, at 21 (recognizing that costs of litigating qui
tam action by private individual is prohibitive without Justice Department inter-
vention). Typical litigation costs for whistleblowers were estimated in 1986 to
range from $20,000 to $700,000, depending on the practice challenged and the
identity of the defendant. Barbara Bradley, High Cost of Conscience: Guidelines on
Prudence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 8, 1986, at 25 (pointing out that
whistleblowing can often be too costly to pursue, especially if challenging gov-
ernment agency).
213. See Strasser, supra note 22, at 43.
214. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1988). For a discussion of this provision,
see supra note 188.
215. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 155-61 and accompany-
ing text.
216. Anyone familiar with TV or movie Westerns knows about reward pos-
ters (and "bounty hunters"). Postal patrons are also familiar with the updated
[Vol. 37: p. 273326
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method of reward, qui tam, represents a law enforcement concept
that existed in England for hundreds of years and was passed on
to our legal system.21 7 Indeed, the First Congress, as well as sub-
sequent Congresses, authorized payments to informers in the
form of qui tam actions. 218 While most of these early actions have
since been repealed or become dormant as the government
moved on to different enforcement tactics, they demonstrate the
entrenched custom of rewards in law enforcement. 219
The FCA is perhaps different from previous qui tam statutes
in degree, but not in spirit. The size of the reward-even the
chance to become very wealthy-does not change the basic idea
of giving financial incentives to citizen enforcers; it merely en-
courages more vigorous enforcement to the extent that large re-
wards act as a spur.220 Further, with FCA rewards, the size of the
reward is directly related to the magnitude of the fraud; hence,
the reward is proportional to the wrongdoer's action, as well as to
the benefit to the government. 22'
versions that hang in post offices. The FCA is more benign than the "dead or
alive" attitude of those earlier times.
217. See Caminker, Comment, supra note 113, at 341-42 (discussing origin
of qui tam actions).
218. The First Congress authorized at least 11 qui tam actions of various
kinds. In three of these authorized actions, informers were allowed to keep the
entire recovery. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 55, 1 Stat. 145, 173 (setting up
table of fees for collectors, naval officers, surveyors); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11,
§ 21, 1 Stat. 55, 60 (providing for recovery of penalties and forfeitures in coastal
trade); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 44-45 (itemizing fees of
collectors, naval officers, surveyors); see also Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement? 78 YALE LJ. 816, 825-27 (1969) (dis-
cussing century-old "informer" statutes which offered inducements to prosecute
actions); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Govern-
ance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406-09 (1988) (discussing statutes providing for
collection of portion of judgment by informers); Caminker, Comment, supra
note 113, at 341-43.
219. For examples of existing but generally dormant statutes, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 962 (1982) (providing one half of forfeit for informer who gives information
about someone in U.S. arming foreign vessel); 25 U.S.C. § 201 (1982) (provid-
ing one half of penalty recovered for informer who gives information about of-
fenses under Protection of Indians statutes); 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1982)
(providing one half of penalty recovered for person suing for false marking
under patent laws).
220. For a discussion of social-psychological literature suggesting that re-
wards must be sufficiently large to motivate desired behavior effectively, see
supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
221. The benefits of whistleblowing often are not just monetary. In the
defense arena, for example, weapons safety and accuracy and ultimately national
security can be implicated. See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 117, at 3, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266. According to the Senate Report:
The cost of fraud cannot always be measured in dollars and cents, how-
ever.... Even in the cases where there is no dollar loss-for example
19921
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One potential problem with qui tam actions is that they can be
viewed as government-promoted spying. Another perspective of
the action is possible, however. A qui tam action can be viewed as
a democratic mechanism which gives an individual a measure of
control over the large organizations with which he or she is forced
to deal. An additional governmental benefit of a recognized citi-
zen role in this context is that it allows greater law enforcement
than is available to prosecuting agencies, agencies which face "the
harsh reality of today's funding limitations. ' 222 The citizen role
also makes enforcement possible when the government, for
proper or improper reasons, declines to act. 22 3
Other well-established statutes also follow the reward tradi-
tion. For example, statutes which allow civil suits for treble dam-
ages authorize a citizen enforcement role analogous to the role
provided for in qui tam actions. One such statute is RICO. 224 In
where a defense contractor certifies an untested part for quality yet
there are no apparent defects-the integrity of quality requirements in
procurement programs is seriously undermined. A more dangerous
scenario exists where in the above example the part is defective and
causes not only a serious threat to human life, but also to national
security.
Id.
222. 132 CONG. REC. 29,321-22 (1986) (statement of Rep. Berman includ-
ing legislative history for record) (recognizing financial limitations of govern-
ment as one reason for qui tam plaintiff role).
223. See Caminker, Comment, supra note 113, at 351 (endorsing private en-
forcement of qui tam actions). In some instances, the whistleblower may be the
only one who is willing or free to act to protect the public good. In other cases,
the impact of the revolving door or the dependence of certain agencies on con-
tractors could lead to less than diligent enforcement. Certainly, incidents of re-
fusal to prosecute and retaliation against federal employee whistleblowers by
those given enforcement powers under the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302 (1982), have been well documented. For example, up to 90% of employ-
ees appealing administrative decisions regarding retaliation for whistleblowing
under the Civil Service Reform Act during the Reagan administration lost those
appeals. 3 INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RTs. (BNA) 4 (1988).
224. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The civil RICO pro-
visions are modeled on the antitrust laws and both have been effective in pro-
moting citizen enforcement. See G. Robert Blakey, Forward. Debunking RICO's
Myriad Myths, 64 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 701, 707 (1990) (describing criminal en-
forcement mechanisms for RICO); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988) (providing
for recovery of treble damages and costs by person injured as result of antitrust
violation).
The treble damages private enforcement mechanism of the antitrust laws
has as its objective the encouragement of "private challenges to antitrust viola-
tions." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (discussing private
antitrust suits as supplement to Department of Justice enforcement). Histori-
cally, the great preponderance of antitrust claims have been instituted by private
plaintiffs. See Blakey, supra, at 708 n.51 (stating that, between 1960 and 1980,
84% of antitrust claims were instituted by private plaintiffs); Steven C. Salop &
Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEo. L.J.
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fact, when discussing the potential impact of the FCA, commenta-
tors often compare it with RICO.2 2 5 One of RICO's main meth-
ods of reaching its primary goal-combatting organized crime-
was to strengthen "the evidence gathering process, an objective
partially addressed by allowing civil suits for treble damages."2 26
According to the Supreme Court, this opportunity for treble dam-
ages gives potential plaintiffs vigorous incentives to pursue claims
and to help correct "a serious national problem for which public
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate." 227 Since its
passage in 1970, lawsuits involving RICO have grown both in
number and variety as claimants, building on expansive judicial
interpretations of the statute, found treble damages an induce-
ment for initiating or broadening civil lawsuits based on criminal
acts.
2 28
1001, 1002 (1986) (providing table which exhibits relative numbers of govern-
ment and private antitrust cases commenced for the period 1941-1984).
225. See France, supra note 33, at 49; Strasser, supra note 22, at 43.
226. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (stating that purpose
of RICO was to eradicate organized crime with enhanced sanctions and new
remedies).
227. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151(1987) (comparing remedy provisions of RICO and Clayton Act); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987) (stating that Clayton Act
was model for RICO treble damages provision).
228. For examples of cases in which there has been an expansive interpre-
tation of RICO, see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985)
(holding that there is no requirement for prior violation or "racketeering injury"
to bring private action under RICO); Alcorn County v. United States Interstate
Supplies, 731 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that alleged injury involv-
ing bribery, threats, payment for goods never received fell within scope of
RICO); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 648 F. Supp. 17, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(stating that bankruptcy fraud and bribery sufficient to meet RICO "two act"
pattern requirement).
This broad interpretation has prompted vigorous calls for reform. See, e.g.,
Rene Augustine, Introduction, Reforming RICO: If Why and How?, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 621, 621 (1990); Mark P. Cohen, Civil RICO Under Fire: Will White Collar
Criminals Be Exempted?, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 153, 154 (1986); Francis J. Flaherty, A
RICO Crisis, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
and Congress have so far declined to limit RICO's scope. The opinions of the
Supreme Court to date have not reflected an urgent need for reform of the stat-
ute. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237-43, 249-50
(1989) (interpreting and applying relationship and continuity requirements of
RICO as written); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500 (discussing standing requirements
for private civil action and deciding that any corrections lie with Congress). The
Court's decisions, however, have contained an invitation for Congress to rewrite
the statute if it disagrees with the adopted interpretation. See, e.g., Sedima, 473
U.S. at 499-500 (stating that any defect in RICO must be corrected by Con-
gress). Congress in turn has declined to pass any of the RICO reform measures
proposed thus far. See John M. Nonna & Melissa P. Corrado, RICO Reform:
"Weeding Out" Garden Variety Disputes Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 825, 825 (1990) (noting that Congress has not
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Use of the civil RICO provisions was slower to ignite than has
been the case with the FCA. 229 The recent use of RICO has been
explosive, however; there were 950 civil RICO cases filed in fed-
eral district courts in 1988, and that number increased to 1,225
by 1989.230 If the FCA follows the RICO pattern, but at its con-
tinued accelerated pace, its use-and consequent deterrent ef-
fect-will easily satisfy the hopes of the sponsors of the 1986
amendments. 23 1
While there are other means to achieve this objective of dis-
closure of wrongdoing that do not involve rewards-most notably
citizen enforcement actions such as those allowed in the environ-
mental area2 32 -most of the information that is brought forth in
qui tam actions comes from employees. 233 This makes a differ-
ence. The risks to these individuals of losing their jobs or any
passed any amendments to the civil RICO provisions since 1984). In addition,
proponents of the status quo argue that a broad application of the law is justified
by stating that business fraud "has become a national blight." See Cohen, supra,
at 154 (discussing RICO controversy and sentiments of those for and against
statute).
229. For instance, although the statute had been passed a decade earlier,
only nine civil RICO cases were filed in 1980. ABA SECTION ON CORPORATE
BANKING AND BusINEss LAw, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55
(1985); see also Petra J. Rodriguez, Note, The Civil RICO Racket: Fighting Back with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 931, 936 n.20 (1990) (not-
ing that civil RICO, enacted in 1970, was slow to catch attention of legal
community).
230. See Rodriguez, Note, supra note 229, at 936 n.20 (citing statistics sup-
plied in telephone interview by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports Division).
231. One difference between FCA qui tam plaintiffs and plaintiffs bringing
RICO or antitrust claims must be kept in mind. While the possibility of recover-
ing treble damages may play an important role in encouraging citizen enforcers
to pursue antitrust and RICO defendants, these claimants differ in an important
way from FCA relators: they have been, in some way, directly harmed by the
violations. Thus, RICO and antitrust claimants are not simply reward seekers.
In contrast, FCA claimants in most instances can make only the broadest
allegation of injury, i.e., that their interests as taxpayers were harmed. It is un-
likely, however, that this difference will have an effect on the validity of FCA
rewards as a method to encourage citizen enforcement. If greed, in combination
with revenge, is not an inappropriate source of motivation for initiating RICO
and antitrust claims, greed alone should not call into question the propriety of
an FCA relator's suit.
232. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)
(providing for civil action); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (providing
for civil action against any person who violates Act's emission control
standards).
233. Qui tam and other reward actions recognize that much information
needed for enforcement is extremely difficult to obtain without the help of in-
sider informers. See S. REP. No. 345, supra note 117, at 2-3, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-68.
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meaningful chance for career advancement is substantial.23 4
Thus, it is arguably not inappropriate to allow significant awards
to offset these risks. 2 35
Another alternative to the "carrot" of financial incentives for
blowing the whistle is the "stick" of sanctions against people who
do not come forward with important information or who do not
take action to prevent wrongdoing. Like qui tam actions, citizen
enforcement through sanctions has a long history of use. The old
common law crime of misprision of felony was used to punish citi-
zens who failed to disclose to the government useful information
about the commission of a felony.23 6 Misprision of felony was en-
acted into the codes of several states and the United States. 23 7 It
has, however, seldom been used. 23 s
More recently, the idea of punishment for failure to provide
information is being employed with regard to certain social ills
such as child abuse and breaches of professional ethics.2 39 So far
234. For a discussion of the relationship between risk and reward, see supra
note 90 and accompanying text.
235. Indeed, the developer of the modern qui tam provision, John Phillips
of the Center for Law in the Public Interest, asserts that the rewards are appro-
priate because the whistleblower must often risk ajob or a career. "The qui tam
reforms were designed to put those risks on the plane of an investment decision
.... Joining patriotism and money is a very powerful force." Strasser, supra
note 22, at 42 (quoting John Phillips).
Groups advocating whistleblowing have published tips on how to minimize
the risks. These include verifying the information, keeping a log of conduct ob-
served and steps taken to get the problem rectified, determining what laws
might protect the whistleblower, and how the whistleblowing must be done to
receive protection. See, e.g., Dunkin, supra note 175, at 139 (providing Govern-
ment Accountability Project's recommendations for minimizing risks; recom-
mendations to whistleblowers also included not running to media, not assuming
that law covers them, not expecting windfall if fired).
236. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw 526 (1972)
(defining misprision of felony as "failure to report or prosecute known felon").
237. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (defining offense of misprision as
imposing liability on person having knowledge of actual commission of felony
and not just failure to provide information as soon as possible); CAL. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 38 (West 1988) (providing now only for misprision of treason).
238. See Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934) (declin-
ing to invoke misprision of felony statute for "mere failure to disclose"); Hol-
land v. State, 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (declining to adopt
misprision of felony into Florida substantive law); see also LAFAVE & Scorr, supra
note 236, at 526 (expressing doubt as to whether misprision offense "ever had a
meaningful existence beyond the textbook writers"). But see Blumberg, supra
note 182, at 293-94 ("In recent years . . . the doctrine [of misprision] has
demonstrated considerable vitality.")
239. See Deborah Graham, The Whistle-Blowers, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1986, at 72
(discussing lawyers who have disclosed wrongdoing in legal profession); Reiner
H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 53 (1986) (discussing employment of "gatekeeper"
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the results have been mixed.240 It appears that, while profession-
als often resent having the law enforcement role forced upon
them when put in a position of being required to breach the confi-
dentiality of their patients, clients or colleagues, they may be
more susceptible to threats than enticements. 241 In contrast, re-
wards are more likely to motivate whistleblowing in other em-
ployment situations. 242  Bearing in mind the type of
whistleblower sought to be encouraged, it seems preferable in
these days of proliferating offenses and sanctions to reward
whistleblowing rather than to impose sanctions. 243
strategy for enforcement of securities regulations). In 1990, the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants, the major professional group of the ac-
counting profession, came out in favor of requiring auditors to notify regulators
of possible illegal acts by companies. Rosin Goldwyn Blumenthal, Accounting
Group Reverses Its Position, Backs Bill on Creditors Blowing Whistle, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14, 1990, at A2.
240. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 239, at 72 (stating that, with widespread
failure to blow whistle, lawyers do not consider it their responsibility to monitor
ethics of others in profession); Jane C. Norman, So-Called Physician "Whistle-blow-
ers" Protected, 11 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC. 3 (1983) (recognizing that physi-
cian participation on committees to blow whistle on peers is exchanged for
immunity from lawsuit); Ronald D. Rotunda, Client Fraud: Blowing the Whistle,
Other Options, TRIAL, Nov. 1988, at 92 (stating that ethical rules encourage attor-
ney whistleblowing for client fraud except where information is privileged);
Martha Brannigan, Arrests Spark Furor Over the Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 1989, at 8 (stating that arrests of teachers for failing to
report child abuse was feared to spark avalanche of unwarranted reports); An-
drew Blum, Associate Sues Firm in Flap Over Discharge, NAT'L L.J., June 18, 1990, at
14 (discussing attorney allegedly fired for prodding law firm to report ethics
violation by fellow associate); Sherry R. Sontag, The Duty of Lawyers To Blow the
Whistle on Clients Is Unclear, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 3 (stating that lawyers
and accountants may be liable for failing to blow whistle on savings and loan
institutions).
241. See, e.g., David Gwilliam, Whistleblowing: They're Playing Our Tune, 97 Ac-
COUNTANCY 13, 13 (1986) (discussing pressure by regulatory agencies on audi-
tors to blow whistle on financial fraud); Rorie Sherman, Bioethics Debate, NAT'L
L.J., May 13, 1991, at 1 (quoting Janet Benshoof, Director of ACLU Reproduc-
tive Rights Project, as expressing surprise that public would be willing to make
doctors policemen of pregnant women).
The results of a recent National Law Journal/LEXIS national poll indicate
that the public may not be uncomfortable with an active enforcement role for at
least some professionals. For example, 57% of the respondents would require
physicians who suspect that their pregnant patients are abusing drugs or alcohol
to make a report to the government. See Sherman, supra, at 30. Rewards, how-
ever, are unlikely to motivate a doctor to blow the whistle on a patient or the
parent of a patient-child if the doctor has any questions as to the validity of his
or her report.
242. For a discussion of the relationship between rewards, motivation and
employee situations, see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. 556 (1822). "It may be the duty of
a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense which comes to
his knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case, for not per-
forming this duty, is too harsh for man." Id.; see also Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d
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D. Organizational Consequences
The calls for whistleblowers to police organizations have elic-
ited strong responses. For example:
Some of the enemies of business now encourage an em-
ployee to be disloyal to the enterprise. They want to cre-
ate suspicion and disharmony and pry into the
proprietary interests of the business. However this is la-
belled-industrial espionage, whistle blowing or profes-
sional responsibility-it is another tactic for spreading
disunity and creating conflict. 244
While these remarks were made at a time when employment
at will was still in full force and employers were unaccustomed to
being challenged, the concerns raised retain a measure of legiti-
macy. In the organizational context, rewarding whistleblowing
may nourish a climate of suspicion, hostility and defensiveness. 245
This may result in a loss of group identity, loyalty, and morale,
and a consequent loss of efficiency. 246 These dangers are not as
great as they once were, however, for two reasons: (1) there has
been a fundamental change in the nature of the employment rela-
tionship; and (2) whistleblowing is emerging as a tool for corpo-
rate as well as government use.
With the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine and the
rise of employee rights, the time has passed when an employer
could demand-and indeed, had the right to expect-loyalty at all
costs. 24 7 The right of employees to act out of conscience is recog-
nized by most courts, legislatures and commentators as para-
806, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (eschewing as harsh and oppressive enforce-
ment of misprision of felony); Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1078 (Md. 1979)
(holding misprision of felony not chargeable offense in child abuse case,
although failure to prevent child abuse fell within child abuse statute).
244. Jerry M. Flint, G.M. 's Chief Scores Critics of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1971, at 53 (quoting James M. Roche, then Chairman of General Motors).
245. See Blumberg, supra note 182, at 297 (stating that suspicion leads to
loss of human values within organization); Coffee, supra note 108, at 1147 (view-
ing whistleblowing as "treason" and dependence on whistleblowers as
counterproductive).
246. See Near & Miceli, supra note 186, at 1-2 (stating that whistleblowing is
documented as leading to decline in organizations' authority and to "reduced
loyalty, commitment, and task performance"); Walters, supra note 182, at 30-31
(discussing organizational friction resulting from whistleblowing).
247. See Alan F. Westin, Why Whistleblowing is on the Rise, in WHISTLE BLOW-
ING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 4-10 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1981);
Halbert, supra note 185, at 5-10 (discussing evolution of at-will employment);
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 117, at 267, 285-86 (discussing protection and
encouragement of whistleblowers as exception to employment-at-will).
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mount to the duty of loyalty to the organization. 248 Protected
whistleblowing is just one manifestation of the equalization of
rights in the employment relationship.
In recognition of this equalization, the increased litigiousness
of the employment relationship and the hostility with which busi-
ness and government are viewed, a new ethos is emerging. There
is increased emphasis on ethics and awareness of employee con-
cerns.2 49 Whistleblowers are beginning to be viewed as a re-
source that can help correct wrongdoing before it "irrevocably
harms the organization or others." 250 For example, a recent
study showed that a majority of companies had clearly defined
policies to deal with employee concerns about legal, moral
and/or ethical issues.251 In order to maximize the utility of
whistleblowing to the organization, however, the whistle must be
blown to the organization and not to some outside entity. It is in
this regard that the False Claims Act and similar reward structures
may be the most harmful.
The FCA demands that, in order to collect the reward, the
248. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336-37
(Cal. 1980) (holding that employer's authority over employee does not include
right to demand that employee commit criminal act); Palmeteer v. International
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (holding that discharge of em-
ployee contravenes public policy if employer had committed legal wrong);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978) (holding that
employer's absolute right to discharge at-will employee does not apply when
discharge contravenes public policy); see also Blumberg, supra note 182, at 300-15
(discussing balancing of private employee's duty as citizen with duty of loyalty to
employer); Halbert, supra note 185, at 20-27 (discussing professional employee's
duty to public-at-large); Malin, supra note 185, at 318 (discussing conflict be-
tween whistleblowing and loyalty to employer); Rogine, supra note 185, at 284-
89 (stating that employee's duty of loyalty is not absolute); Walters, supra note
182, at 32-34 (discussing fact that courts sanction idea of whistleblowing as de-
sire to improve performance and quality of public service). For a discussion of
legislative protection from retaliation for employees, see supra notes 8-17 and
accompanying text.
249. See Timothy R. Barnett & Daniel S. Cochran, Making Room for the
Whistleblower, HuM. RESOURCES MAG.,Jan. 1991, at 58 (describing whistleblowing
policy whereby employee can communicate without fear of reprisal); Brody,
supra note 175, at 77 (encouraging managers to set up whistleblowing "hot-
line"); Benson Rosen & Catherine Schwoerer, Balanced Protection Policies, HUM.
RESOURCES MAG., Feb. 1990, at 61 (focusing on balance between employer and
employee rights); Srodes, supra note 22, at 57-60 (discussing evolution of cur-
rent emphasis on ethics in business).
250. Barnett & Cochran, supra note 249, at 58; see also Brody, supra note
175, at 77 (advocating use of employee grievance procedures to discover
problems); Jeffrey L. Sheler, When Employes [sic] Squeal on Fellow Workers-, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 16, 1981, at 81-82 (pointing out that many compa-
nies recognize value of employee complaints).
251. See Barnett & Cochran, supra note 249, at 60.
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wrongdoing must be brought to the attention of the government
through the filing of a lawsuit. Employees who work for a com-
pany with an internal whistleblowing procedure and decide to
blow the whistle thus are faced with a conflict of interest. They
can maximize their economic interests by going outside the or-
ganization, or help protect the organization's interests by making
an internal disclosure.2 52 To the extent that large money rewards
encourage the former route, financial incentives are detrimental
to an organization that is willing to be responsive to the
information.
To avoid these consequences, procedures to encourage re-
porting within the organization can be established. Perhaps the
most potent alternative would be an internal system of financial
or other rewards. Although it would be unrealistic for an organi-
zation to offer monetary rewards in amounts equivalent to those
which could be gained through an FCA action, relative advan-
tages in terms of speed and ease of recovery might encourage
utilization of the in-house procedure as opposed to FCA litiga-
tion. In addition, such a system would permit the reporting em-
ployee to maintain his or her loyalty to the organization and co-
workers. Several firms have already implemented such reward
programs and this is an idea that deserves closer examination.2 53
There is also another side to this inherent conflict between
internal and external rewards. Internal whistleblowing protects
organizational interests at the expense of the public treasury. It is
impossible to tell at this time whether increased organizational
loyalty, morale and efficiency compensates for the loss of these
monies. It is clear, however, that whether the disclosure is inter-
nal or external, society will only be benefitted if the organization
uses the information to stop the wrongful behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the call to conscience has had limited appeal
252. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 117, at 267 (discussing govern-
ment protection for internal whistleblowing). Organizational advantages in-
clude giving the organization the opportunity to take corrective action, thereby
reducing the likelihood of lost business, adverse publicity, litigation, fines or
other criminal sanctions. The organization can build loyalty and ethical behav-
ior by listening to, and/or rewarding the whistleblower. Finally, misperceptions
on the part of the whistleblower can be more easily corrected. See also Jensen,
supra note 184, at 324-25 (noting that employee loyalty often involves confiden-
tiality and understanding of importance of inside information).
253. For a discussion of corporations offering such rewards, see supra note
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for potential whistleblowers. Virtue may be its own reward, but
for many, money is more gratifying. Thus, widespread legislative
attention, on both federal and state levels, has been given to the
idea of support for whistleblowers. Although few would disagree
that the extension of legal protection to persons who suffer retali-
ation as a result of blowing the whistle is appropriate, the advisa-
bility of affirmatively encouraging whistleblowing through
financial incentives remains in question.
The 1986 amendments to the FCA, strengthening that finan-
cial incentive, have spurred reporting and enriched both the fed-
eral treasury and relators, presumably by encouraging persons
who would not otherwise blow the whistle to make disclosures of
wrongful conduct. 254 There are, however, practical costs associ-
ated with this privatization of the law enforcement function, in
addition to the policy concerns.2 55
Are the gains worth the price? A few more millionaires, and
a few million dollars for the federal treasury are probably not
worth the loss of trust and atmosphere of cooperation. Other sig-
nificant gains must occur if this system of encouraging
whistleblowing is to be deemed desirable. If financial incentives
significantly increase the number of individuals willing to speak
out against harmful activity, deter potential wrongdoers by the
threat of whistleblowing, facilitate the redress of wrongdoing that
has occurred, and encourage organizations to police themselves,
then self-interested law enforcement may be worth its costs. A
reduction in wrongdoing, not the individual benefit to snitches, is
the final, societal reward.
254. The government has recovered almost $70 million, and relators, $9
million. Waldman, supra note 181, at 13.
255. For a discussion of some of these concerns, see supra notes 244-52 and
accompanying text. In governmental terms, the Justice Department has been
forced to reorder priorities in some instances, taking law enforcement resources
away from areas that the Department may deem to be more in the national inter-
est. FCA Implementation Hearing, supra note 118, at 9-14 (testimony of Stuart Ger-
son). In 1989, the Justice Department estimated that one-quarter of attorney
time in the Civil Fraud Section was spent on FCA claims, but the amount recov-
ered was only a small portion of the amount recovered in other types of claims.
Strasser, supra note 22, at 42. The government had joined in few cases at that
time, however, and even fewer had been resolved to the point of recovery.
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